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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the relationship between perceived marginalisation and the willingness of 
civilians to participate in, and justify political violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. The 
dominant literature in this area tends to highlight political, economic and identity marginalisation 
as the causal factors behind political violence. However, there remains a lack of clarity in the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the purported political and socioeconomic 
marginalisations. This because large portion of the literature fails to take into account the 
psychological aspect of marginalisation. Using a statistical analysis of Afrobarometer1 survey data 
collected in 2003, the study applies two regression models to measure the predictive effects of 16 
variables on attitudes towards both political violence justification and the willingness to participate 
in political violence in the Niger Delta. The benefit of survey methodology is it is a more accurate 
measurement of the term marginalisation, as marginalisation is perceived by people and is thus a 
psychological phenomenon. By disaggregating these broad marginalisation terms into discrete 
items, this study provides a more nuanced analysis of the motivating factors behind political 
violence. Interestingly, no measures of economic marginalisation were statistically significant in 
either model. Two elements of political marginalisation exhibited a statistically significant effect 
on the justification of political violence. Multiple aspects of political marginalisation and identity 
group prioritisation exhibited statistically significant effect on the willingness to participate in 
political violence, however not all items exhibited effects predicted by the majority of the 
literature. This analysis does confirm that the relationship between citizen and state is a salient 
predictor of attitudes towards political violence. However, the results also demonstrate that the 
blanket marginalisation terms used in political science literature are overly simplistic and lack 
nuance. Nevertheless, both scholars and policy makers should prioritise the government’s 
relationship with society when crafting policy designed to minimise political violence.  
 
 
1 Afrobarometer “is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on 
democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. 
[Afrobarometer] is the world’s leading research project on issues that affect ordinary African men and women. 
[Afrobarometer] collect[s] and publish[es] high-quality, reliable statistical data on Africa which is freely available to 
the public” (Afrobarometer, n.d.). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Delta 
Background to Problem 
 
The Niger Delta houses 28.9 of the 186 million people that constitute Nigeria’s expanding 
population and is an area prone to conflict. The population is highly heterogeneous, with people 
belonging to various ethnic and religious groups vying for scarce political and economic resources. 
This study analyses the relationship between perceived political and socioeconomic 
marginalisations and the willingness of non-government security force personnel (civilians or 
people belonging to militant groups) to participate in, and justify political violence in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta region. The region is rich in natural resources. It is comprised of nine states - Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo and Rivers – within which the largest wetlands 
in Africa are found, as well as myriad oil and natural gas fields. The revenue generated from the 
Delta’s vast oil reserves reportedly accounts for 90% of Nigeria’s wealth (Tobor, 2016).  However, 
the wealth has not been distributed to the majority of the region’s population. As Tobor asserts,  
“Instead of improving the quality of life of the inhabitants in the region, the discovery and 
exploitation of oil has led to worse living standards, lost income for the inhabitants as their 
main source of livelihood from fishing, carving, and dwindling agricultural sector has not 
replaced employment with another industry” (2016, p.26).  
 
Poverty, unemployment and diachronic conflict are a persistent feature in the Delta, despite the 
region’s oil wealth. This has led to a multitude of researchers asserting that the socioeconomic 
marginalisation experienced by the Niger Delta residents has driven political violence incidents in 
the region.  Moreover, from the 1970s, people from communities situated in close proximity to the 
oil and natural gas deposits have formed militias that attack interests associated with the extraction 
of the region’s natural resources (Watts, 2004).  
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Another feature is that Nigeria is divided along ethnic and religious lines.  There are the Yoruba, 
whose main residential region is the southwest, and there are the predominantly Christian Igbo 
group whose primary residential area is in the southeast. The Yoruba and the Igbo are the largest 
groups countrywide, which represent “approximately 20 and 16 percent of the population, 
respectively” (Mähler, 2010, p. 22). The Niger Delta is comprised of many smaller ethnic groups, 
with the largest being the Ijaw, representing approximately 8 percent of the Nigerian population 
(Mähler, 2010, p. 22). The unequal distribution of wealth in the country overall has manifested as 
large wealth disparities between regions and ethnic groups, thus exacerbating already existing 
tensions. As Omeje (2004, p.428) argues, “the state itself is, to a large extent, dominated by an 
unstable coalition of some ethnic majority elites whose geographical homelands have little or no 
oil reserves”. The dynamic of wealth generated from the Delta – which is siphoned out of the 
region’s communities without adequate compensation –  has led to social unrest and sustained 
conflict in the region (Clauson, 2011; Mähler, 2010). Watts (2004, p. 51) describes the context of 
conflict since 2003, where oil production is linked to politics and violence in the region.  
 
President Obasanjo’s deployments of notoriously corrupt security forces to the Delta 
prompted further violence and threats by Ijaw militants to detonate 11 occupied oil 
installations. On 19 March 2003 all of the oil majors withdrew staff and closed operations, 
with the consequence that production has dropped by 817,000 barrels per day (40 per cent 
of national production.  
 
In 2005, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged as the area’s 
largest militia faction where it has since targeted the oil and natural gas industry systematically in 
a series of highly publicized violent attacks. These persisted until 2009, following the 
implementation of an amnesty programme for militants. The series of MEND’s attacks on the oil 
industry led to decreased petroleum production and the country’s overall economic output. As 
Clausen states, “Through sustained attacks on oil multinationals, oil installations, and government 
security forces, within a matter of days of its launch close to one-third of national output was shut-
in” (2011, p.21). In the first three quarters of 2008, reports alleged that the Nigerian government 
lost USD 23.7 billion in oil revenue as a consequence of attacks orchestrated by MEND and other 
militia groups in the Delta region (Clauson, 2011). Although violence reduced drastically 
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following the aforementioned amnesty deal, violent uprisings and attacks on natural resource 
industry facilities and personnel have resumed since the deal’s expiration in 2016 (Tobor, 2016). 
 
This has led to widespread dissatisfaction among people living in the region, expressed through 
popular mobilisation taking the form of demonstrations and riots, which tend to turn violent, and 
the aforementioned attacks on the region’s natural resource interests. One of the reasons for the 
widespread social dissatisfaction result from the brutal counter-insurgency campaign by the 
Nigerian state, which has led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and wiped out entire villages 
and communities (Connect SAIS Africa, 2018; Ikelegbe, 2005). Citizens also protest against the 
area’s wealth disparity, as compared to the urban centres of Nigeria. Protests and violent 
mobilisations have also been recorded due to environmental damage caused by the liquid natural 
gas and petroleum industries. The violence affects the daily lives of the population; however, these 
instances of mobilisation have received less global attention than have the high profile attacks on 
transnational corporate interests (Gberevbie, Oyeyemi, & Excellence-Oluye, 2014). To address 
the persistent outbreaks of violence in the region, both from the government and the general Delta 
communities, a deeper understanding of the underlying motivations behind participation in 
political violence is necessary.  
 
As Williams (2016) argues, military or short-term measures aimed at quelling political violence 
often fail in sub-Saharan Africa because they do not address the factors that allow violent 
dispositions to exist. Therefore, strategies aimed at addressing these underlying factors will be 
more effective than attempting to quell political violence with military repression or destructive 
and ineffective counterinsurgency campaigns (Gurr, 2013). However, before strategies can be 
synthesised, the aforementioned factors that can lead to violence need to be understood. The 
propensity for violence is not reserved to criminals, deviants or those people who have a 
psychological predisposition for violence. The violent history of the 20th Century reveals that 
‘normal’ persons classified as non-deviants, according to sociological standards (Gurr, 2013), 
often engage in acts of political violence. No state has been able to completely deter citizens from 
engaging in political violence, even via the utilisation of extreme coercion (Gurr, 2013). As such, 
this study will analyse the factors that contribute to peoples’ motivations to participate in, and 
justify politically-motivated violence. 
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1.1 Research Question 
 
Do perceived levels of political, economic and social identity group marginalisation in the Niger 
Delta region affect propensity to justify and engage in political violence? 
1.2 Conceptual Clarification 
 
1.2.1 Political Violence 
 
This study’s dependent variable is people's justification of, and willingness to engage in political 
violence, as measured by two separate dependent variables. The study does not measure actual 
incidents of political violence but uses survey data to measure respondents’ propensities to justify 
and participate in political violence. Political violence is a complex and contested concept. The 
term ‘political violence’ broadly, refers to both state violence and violence caused by civil 
insurrection. However, this dissertation is concerned with the motivations behind, and the 
justifications of political violence as exhibited by citizens that are not associated with the state 
security apparatus. As Gurr argues, political violence "challenge [s] the monopoly of force imputed 
by the state" and can "interfere with... and destroy normal political processes (2010, p.4).  
 
However, the Afrobarometer questionnaire does not define political violence despite the term 
being used in multiple survey questions. When asked to clarify, the person in charge of the 
codebook and data informed me, “we don’t have a definition of such [political violence]. 
Interviewers are asked to just keep to the script of the questionnaire”. The lack of clear definition 
in the framing of the questions related to political violence presents a limitation of the study, as 
respondents must interpret the entails of political violence subjectively. However, Afrobarometer 
does not explicitly define what constitutes the ‘political realm’ as distinct from the personal.  
 
Conge (1998) defines the ‘political realm’ as relating to a nation state at all levels, from federal to 
local government structures. Although other definitions may utilise a broader definition 
concerning one’s relationship with societal power structures, this study conceptualises the political 
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realm (political, politics, etc.)  as one (or a group’s) relationship with the Nigerian state. It is also 
important to note the distinction between private and political goals, and hence private and political 
violence (Kalyvas, 2003).  Kalyvas argues that whilst they are distinct, the line can often become 
blurred between the two. The distinction between what makes violence political is articulated 
clearly by Andre du Toit,  
Typically, political violence is differentiated from other forms of violence by claims to a 
special moral or public legitimation for the injury or harm done to others as well as the by 
the representative character of the agents and targets of these acts of violence. The 
demonstrators throwing stones at the police, and the security forces shooting or whipping 
protest marchers differ from a similar number of people engaged in a brawl …in that they 
believe that their acts of violence are sanctioned or even required, by a higher morality or 
public cause, be that, in the one case, the struggle against injustice and oppression, or in 
the other case, the maintenance of public law and order as the responsibility of the state 
(Du Toit, 1990: 6).  
  
Expanding on Du Toit, I argue that the motivation behind an act of violence, and not the target is 
what constitutes an act as political. Therefore, political violence is not limited to the targeting of 
explicit state interests. Violence is then considered political if the motivation is an attempt to 
change the political status quo or one’s position within that political or state power structure. 
Thus violence that targets corporate interests in the Delta can be considered political provided it 
is motivated by participants’ attempts to garner political or economic concessions and/or power 
from the Nigerian government. While Tilly (2003) argues that violence that changes the 
relationship between the governed and the sovereign constitutes political violence, I avoid this 
broader definition. This because Tilly’s definition would then include violence motivated by 
purely criminal interests if it affected the relationship between citizens and state. This would be 
exemplified by the kidnapping of an oil worker for ransom as opposed to political purposes. I am 
interested in explaining the desire to participate and justify that latter incidents of violence. 
 
 Therefore, for the purpose of this study I follow the conceptual interpretation of both Gurr 
(2010) and Mähler (2010) and define political violence as any form of physical violence carried 
out by persons that are not affiliated with Nigeria’s state security service, and that is used in the 
attempt to achieve a political outcome. Following this definition, the study aims to determine 
what causes the willingness to participate in (and justification of) political violence by non-state 
actors. Non-state actors simply implies persons not aligned with formal or informal state security 
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services. Thus both civilians and members of  militant groups that are not aligned with Nigerian 
government interests are included in this definition. The main independent variables are 
perceived political, economic and identity group marginalisation, as these are the most common 
variables purported by the literature. The three variables are intersectionally linked; (Awodola & 
Ayuba 2015; Courson, 2011; Obi, 2009. However, the primary independent variable is political 
marginalisation.  
 
1.2.2 Political Marginalisation  
 
Marginalisation is associated with alienation, exclusion and/or disparagement. The concept refers 
to exclusion (of the citizen), or the extreme incentivisation to not participate – be it an individual, 
a community, or the selected representation of either – in a country’s political and/or economic 
systems (Oskarason, 2010). I argue that marginalisation can be related to Gurr’s definition of 
relative deprivation, as marginalised individuals compare themselves to other portions of society 
which can result in a perceived sense of deprivation and/or marginalisation. Marginalisation is the 
“peripheralization of individuals and groups, from a dominant central majority” (Hall, 1999, p.89).  
Thus the term marginalisation, in this context, refers to the perceived lack of influence, ability to 
exert power and ability to participate in, and derive benefits from a particular system, be that 
economic or political (Hall, 1999). 
 
Hence, political marginalisation denotes the involuntary exclusion from access and influence to 
state power. As Osaghae (1995) asserts, it is the perceived lack of ability to harness state power 
and/or the perceived lack of control over political affairs leading to a lack of individual or group 
sovereignty and autonomy. This may be in the form of a certain groups’ representatives lacking 
influence within the state, a group lacking the ability to exert any political influence on its 
representatives, a combination of both or the group having no political representation or influence 
on policy at either a state or federal level. In the context of the Niger Delta states, the state 
governments have been excluded from the decision-making process by the federal government 
despite the transition from junta rule to democracy in 1999 (Obi, 2009).  
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This study also views oppression and exclusion as intertwined (Hall, 1999). For this reason certain 
‘oppression’ variables have been included for analysis, as discussed in the Methodology section 
of Chapter Two. As this study analyses individual respondents’ perceived political marginalisation 
as a contributing factor to one’s propensity to engage in, and the justify political violence, all of 
these aspects may apply whilst the person is ‘assessing’ their position in Nigeria’s political, 
economic and social structures.  
 
1.2.3 Economic Marginalisation  
 
The same argument for exclusion, whether by incentives, or explicit barring, applies to economic 
marginalisation. I do not define the ‘economic realm’ only with reference to one’s wealth or 
employment status. A respondent’s living conditions, in addition to the ability to obtain certain 
services - such as access to healthcare and education - also reflect a person’s overall economic 
status. Hence, economic exclusion implies the perceived inability to compete for legally 
sanctioned wealth generating resources within Nigeria. Political influence does contribute to one’s 
ability to generate wealth in Nigeria’s (Ikelegbe 2005; Obi, 2009). However, I do not include it in 
my definition of economic exclusion. Rather, I have separated the two concepts to assess their 
respective effects on willingness to engage in and justify political violence. 
 
1.2.4 Identity Group Marginalisation 
 
The political and economic spheres are areas in which individuals, or a group, may be excluded, 
regardless of their religious, ethnic or racial identities. The third main independent variable - 
identity group marginalisation - is defined as a particular group’s exclusion from one or both of 
these spheres. Political and economic exclusion variables portend to an individual’s perceived 
alienation from either sphere. The identity group variable measures the perceived marginalisation 
of the respondent’s identity group in either dominion. Although the particular identity groups that 
the respondents identified with vary – from religious to ethnic and lingual communities – the term 
‘identity group’ implies a distinct conceptualisation of identity apart from their Nigerian 
citizenship. Furthermore, the measurement and elements, of all three marginalisation concepts will 
be elaborated on in the Methodological portions of Chapter 2. 
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1.2.5 
 
This section has defined the concepts of political, economic and identity group marginalisations. 
All three concepts are intersectionally linked and are perceived psychologically. Political 
marginalisation entails perceived exclusion and/or lack of influence from and within a political 
system. Economic marginalisation can be summarised as the perceived inability to fairly 
compete for legal economic resources. Finally, identity group marginalisation is an individual in 
a group’s perceived exclusion from both or one of these spheres. 
1.3 Literature Review/State of Knowledge 
 
This section reviews the primary theories explaining political violence incidents in the Niger Delta. 
The majority of the literature is focused either on the violence carried out by the region’s various 
iterations of militant groups, which predominantly attack state and transnational resource company 
interests (Courson, 2011; Golden-Timsar, 2018). Additionally a smaller portion of the literature 
focuses on mass mobilisations against the aforementioned state and corporate interests (Omotola, 
2009; Orogun, 2010). Furthermore, as the majority of authors do not make the distinction between 
perceived and actual marginalisation, the literature review does not use the term unless utilised by 
a specific author. 
 
Academic explanations of political violence in the Niger Delta tend to frame conflicts as related 
to aspects of relative deprivation – or marginalisation – be it from ethnic, cultural, social, or 
political exclusion or from economic inequalities. The reasons provided by Omotola (2009, p.38) 
include, “ethnic conflict, hatred, discrimination, and oppression; religious and ideological 
conflicts, socioeconomic relative deprivation; and perceived political inequalities, infringement on 
rights, injustice, or oppression”. While these categories are distinct, economic, political and 
ethnic/social disparities also intersect with one other. As Idemudia & Ite (2007) argue, a multitude 
of variables are required to explain the persistence of violence in the region. While some scholars 
contend that all of these variables compound to create the inclination towards political violence 
(Amaraegbu, 2011), these items can also be disaggregated under economic marginalisation, 
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environmental degradation, political marginalisation and group identity/ethnicity marginalisation 
categories.2 While different groups of scholars place varying levels of significance on the 
aforementioned factors, all tend to agree that marginalisation, in some form, is a key catalyst of 
the numerous outbreaks and subsequent cycles of violence perpetrated by non-state security 
service personnel in the Niger Delta.  
 
As elaborated above, other factors such as environmental degradation and violent 
counterinsurgency strategies by the state have contributed to civilian mobilisations in the Delta 
region (Omotola, 2009). However, as causal factors, these tend to be coupled with other 
manifestations of perceived or actual political marginalisation. To understand the confluence of 
the various forms of marginalisation, I address economic factors first as this is the most common 
‘marginalisation variable’ in the literature (despite the emphasis on intersectionality economic 
marginalisation is the most common marginalisation element) and conceptually transitions into 
political marginalisation arguments. 
 
1.3.1 Economic Marginalisation and Grievance  
 
Economic marginalisation is cited as a key cause of one engaging in political violence.  The 
economic marginalisation explanation rests on the symbiotic relationship between the central 
government and transnational oil companies. As stated previously, the Niger Delta is responsible 
for the vast majority of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the overall income generated in the 
country’s economy (Tobor, 2016). Gberevbie, Oyeyemi, & Excellence-Oluye (2014), Mähler 
(2010) and Tobor (2016) assert that the Delta region continues to suffer from chronic 
underdevelopment which is reflected in the low levels of education and infrastructure, in addition 
to high unemployment rates. Wealth is not seen to “trickle down”, but is rather transported away 
from the Delta region into Abuja, Lagos and bank accounts of international oil companies (Mähler 
, 2010; Watts, 2004). The effect is vast inequality between the urban centres of Nigeria, where the 
wealth is concentrated, and the underdeveloped Niger Delta states. Furthermore, Watts (2004) 
argues that the global perception that wealth was the inextricable by-product of oil further 
 
2 Although discussed in the literature review, this study does not assess the direct effects of environmental 
destruction due to the lack of Afrobarometer questions regarding environmental degradation. 
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antagonised Delta citizens once they a realised that the wealth from resource extraction was not 
being invested into social services and improving the lives of the majority of the population.  
 
Ajayi & Adesote (2013) note the effect of economic marginalisation by citing an incident from 
2005, where a group of Delta delegates walked out of a conference. The conference had been 
established to determine the percentages of oil revenue allocation that the nine Delta states were 
entitled to. Since the 1970’s the percentage of oil revenue allocated to Niger Delta states decreased 
from roughly 50 percent in 1970, to three percent by 1999.  The Delta state delegates walked out 
in protest on the grounds that representatives from other regions determined the petro-revenue 
percentage the Delta states would receive. The Delta representatives and their constituents viewed 
the final outcome as heavily skewed in favour of the central and urban regions (Ajayi & Adesote, 
2013). Thus Ajayi & Adesote (2013) argue that this disparity crystallised the Delta residents’ 
perceptions of economic alienation in the context of perpetual and chronic underdevelopment and 
that this - combined with financial exclusion from resource rents - led to the formation of armed 
militias and violent civil unrest. Thus, the core argument purported by the literature postulates that 
economic inequality perpetuated by natural resource rents, and the associated grievances, caused 
inhabitants to demand change and voice discontent through violence. As Idemudia & Ite (2005, 
p.392) state Delta inhabitants have been “in dispute with the government over access to oil wealth 
and resource control, or they are locked in conflict with one another over claims to ownership of 
areas where oil facilities and accompanying benefits are cited.”  
 
Literature also connects economic deprivation to political violence through the relation to criminal 
activity. As Ikelegbe (2005) and Orogun (2010) argue, there are now vast criminal networks that 
operate on financial concessions generated from illegally activities surrounding mainly the oil 
industry, and to a lesser degree natural gas extraction infrastructure. This results in the formation 
of a criminal or informal economy, which can result in violent attacks such as kidnapping foreign 
nationals and the illegal siphoning of oil for sale on black markets (Ikelegbe, 2005).  
 
Criminal or illicit economic activity is compounded by the fact that oil infrastructure and mishaps 
like oil spills have destroyed local communities’ means of sustenance. Estimates by the UNDP 
assert, “between 1976 and 2001 approximately three million barrels of oil were spilled, and most 
14 
 
of this oil was not recovered” (Mähler, 2010, p. 16). This pollution has killed fish which once 
populated the region’s waterways (Anugwom, 2014). Anugwom (2014) and Idemudia & Ite (2005) 
state that environmental degradation is one of the core causes of violence in the region. Not only 
does pollution diminish economic opportunity, the environmental degradation also destroys a way 
of life, thus making it impossible to engage in certain cultural practices which are dependent on a 
healthy natural environment (Anugworm, 2014). Drinking water and food becomes contaminated 
by oil infrastructure, even in the absence of oil spills, which leads to desperation and can drive 
people towards violence as a means to fulfil their basic needs (Idemudia & Ite, 2005). Additionally, 
Anugworm (2014) and Courson (2001) both argue that the only economic opportunities that exist 
revolve around the oil extraction economy. Therefore, they conclude that because the majority of 
Niger Delta locals do not possess the necessary skills to be hired into the formal oil economy, their 
only option is to participate in the illicit petrol trade. This point is further clarified by Omeje’s 
(2004) who argues that the Nigerian state’s crackdown on the illicit oil trade constrained the Delta 
citizens’ economic prospects, which incentivised people to participate in violent mobilisation.  
Thus the criminal element and environmental explanations, are symptoms of a lack of legitimate 
economic opportunities.  
 
Dating back to the early 1980s, it has been stated that the Delta population has had economic 
grievances because  residents have been unable to obtain what they believe to be a fair share of 
resources revenue allocations (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Osaghae, 1995). Moreover, Courson (2011) 
asserts that these grievances, even when channelled through legitimate or political channels, were 
not addressed and thus violence became the only perceivable avenue the Delta inhabitants could 
utilise.  
1.3.2 Political Marginalisation  
 
Despite numerous scholars attributing Niger Delta political violence to the contention over natural 
resource-derived wealth, another paradigm argues that it is rather political marginalisation in 
which the violence is rooted (Mähler, 2010). Political marginalisation arguments have been 
prevalent in arguments throughout conflict literature pertaining not only to Nigeria but to sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole.  
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The history of marginalisation from economic competition and political influence dates back to 
the early colonial period. Many groups in the Niger Delta functioned as traders between Europeans 
and communities living further inland. However, when the British initiated colonial rule, Delta 
inhabitants lost territorial control and the ability to charge merchants for shipments into the what 
is now the interior of present day Nigeria. The British did little to invest in the region as the empire 
had no initial economic interests in the Delta. Furthermore, during the early colonial period the 
region was underdeveloped, as resources were diverted to infrastructure aimed at increasing the 
country’s cash crop production (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013). Thus even prior to the country’s bid for 
independence, various Delta groups believed they had an unfair lack of political power and pushed 
for the creation of a decentralised distribution of power in order to increase local autonomy (Ajayi 
& Adesote, 2013; Obi, 2009).  As a result of these events, Idemudia & Ite (2005) state that in 
comparison to the rest of Nigeria, the people of the Niger Delta have had less of a political voice, 
as well as fewer economic opportunities, since the beginning of colonialism. 
 
Idemudia & Ite (2005) argue that one of the field’s main assertions is that that Nigeria’s inhabitants 
have little political identity due to the forced or unnatural development of the nation-state by 
colonial powers. They state that after independence, despite the creation of different states in a 
federal system, the central government was the branch that profited from the region’s oil 
extraction. Thus further consolidating power at the federal level and decreasing the political power 
of individual states. “In essence, government failure to deliver developmental benefit in the face 
of perceived political and economic marginalisation created a sense of disenchantment within the 
region” (Idemudia & Ite, 2005, p.397). Tobor (2016) builds on this theory and goes on to argue 
that the Niger Delta inhabitants were denied a federal political identity along with ability to 
represent and govern themselves within the federal government. Starting in the 1990’s with the 
Ogoni uprising, the Nigerian state perpetually responded to peaceful demonstrations with 
repressive violence, thus removing civil disobedience from the repertoire of available political 
grievance recourse. This repression, as argued by Idemudia & Ite (2005), increases perceptions of 
political marginalisation in the region as voices are silenced by the federal authorities. 
 
After the 1999 election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) was created to facilitate development and growth. The plan was to turn the 
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Delta into “a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and 
politically peaceful” (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013, p.511). However, the NDDC was reportedly a 
disappointment to the people of the region as it failed to live up to their expectations due to 
logistical problems, underfunding and lack of political power and influence (Ajayi & Adesote, 
2013). The failure of these nationally-led development plans in the region has led Obi (2009) to 
assert that political marginalisation has created and perpetuated the region’s economic exclusion 
as efforts to procure natural resource revenue are consistently ignored. Obi continues that despite 
half-hearted efforts by various central governments to enact policies to include the region in 
political decision making, the insincerity of such efforts has been painfully obvious to the Delta’s 
inhabitants as even their elected representatives were unable to exert meaningful political will.  
 
Similar to Courson (2011), Ajayi & Adesote (2013) conclude that it thus economic grievance 
combined with political exclusion that lies at the crux of motivations behind  violence. This chronic 
hindrance of political and economic rights is used to explain the recurrence of political violence in 
the region when compared to other areas of the Nigeria (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & Ite 
2005; Mähler, 2010).  Hence, the perceived economic marginalisation from the fruits of economic 
development is seen as a major influence on political mobilization and potential to engage in 
political violence. 
 
Ajayi & Adesote (2013), Obi (2009) and Williams (2016) concur that state sponsored violence and 
repression tactics can also motivate political violence participation. Violence in the form of 
kidnapping, militancy, oil infrastructure sabotage and theft continued into February 2000. In 
response, Nigerian soldiers razed an entire village in what was known as the Odi Invasion after 
they were unable to find suspects accused of kidnapping a foreign oil worker. This incident drew 
international backlash and is often cited as the catalyst for the development of multiple organised 
militant groups in the region. The violence inflicted on the Delta population signified the 
government’s campaign of political and social repression. They not only attempted to stamp out 
criminal activity, but the Nigerian military also shut down - often violently - legal protests 
(Williams, 2016). Additionally, the government was able to use the wealth extracted from the 
Delta to finance its security apparatus, which in turn often violently cracked down on communities 
thought to be harbouring suspected militants. However, this repressive strategy further motivated 
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people to join militias or partake in mass mobilisations against the government thus elucidating 
how government repression can also serve as a motivating factor behind the willingness to 
participate in political violence (Obi, 2009).  
1.3.3 Identity Group Marginalisation 
 
Swathes of studies argue that conflict in the Niger Delta is partly rooted in ethnicity because of 
economic – and political – disparities between ethnic groups (Amaraegbu, 2011; Mähler, 2010; 
Obi, 2009). Many Nigerian citizens identify with multiple group identities, beyond merely the 
national group identity (Olojede, 2000).  Olojede (2000) asserts that a large portion Nigerians 
rather have weaker ties towards their national identity and stronger ties to their clan or ethnic 
identity. For Olojede (2000) this amounts to a weakened sense of political identity, which is 
amplified in Nigeria due the heterogeneity regarding ethnicity and religion, combined with decades 
of changing and often repressive regimes and poor governance. Thus people often identify with a 
communal or ethnic group before identifying as Nigerian, leading to the groups in power to employ 
patronage networks denominated on ethnic lines to maintain their rule. This creates ground for 
further political exclusion and socioeconomic marginalisation along ethnic lines (Olojede, 2000). 
Thus patronage over benevolent public policy has defined the Nigerian political system (Olojede, 
2000). 
 
The control of the central government – and therefore control over oil and natural gas revenues –  
is held by majority ethnic groups who do not reside in the Delta. Obi (2009) asserts that these have 
led to perceptions of distrust of the central government; distrust which has manifested along ethno-
political lines. According to Olojede (2000) the salience of identity groups in forging perception 
of other groups and the state, even where no actual marginalisation is present, may lead to violence.  
 
The Ogoni and Ijaw groups are often cited as groups in the Delta that have been economically and 
politically marginalised, and also who have participated in famous incidents of political violence. 
These include the Ogoni uprising in the early 1990s and the detonation of 11 oil facilities in 2003 
by militants of the Ijaw ethnic group (Courson, 2011; Watts, 2007; Ukeje, 2001). Although the 
mechanisms for ethnic marginalisation can be similar to economic or political marginalisation, 
ethnicity becomes another organising way in which to deny groups the right to self-determination 
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and economic prosperity (Ikelegbe, 2005). Thus the marginalisation of an ethnic group pertains to 
that group’s exclusion from both the economic and political arenas. Stewart (2010) builds on this 
concept and argues that regardless of how group identity is construed, economic and political status 
differences between groups can lead the disenfranchised group into violent mobilisation. 
 
Thus while scholars seem to agree that economic and political marginalisation is the cause of 
political violence, few attempts have been made to define and measure marginalisation.  The above 
mentioned theories and scholars fail to address if, and how, Delta inhabitants interpret or perceive 
their purported economic, political and identity group statuses. Thus the psychological domain of 
marginalisation is left unaddressed and Delta scholars fail to answer how this leads people to 
participate in, or justify political violence. However, there have been a multitude of scholars that 
explore generalisable theories of political violence. These will be discussed in the next section, as 
this is where this study makes its contribution by applying a combination of Delta specific and 
general political violence theories to the Niger Delta states. Although the Delta specific literature 
makes a compelling case for the various marginalisation’s as strong causal variables, a 
combination between specific and general theories, that explain a link to the willingness of action, 
give us a better link between the concept of perceived marginalisation and the propensity to justify 
and engage in political violence. 
 
1.3.4 Conclusion of Literature Review 
 
Inhabitants of the Niger Delta have been marginalised, economically, politically and socially since 
the colonial period. This has led to diachronic violence directed at government and corporate 
interests prompting the government to respond – often with disproportionate military force 
(Williams, 2016). Scholars studying conflict in general, in addition to those focused on the 
violence specific to the Niger Delta states, have used various forms of marginalisation-based 
arguments to explain the political violence perpetrated by organised and individual non-state 
actors. Academic explanations for violence in the Delta region often refined or applied versions of 
the ‘general’ theories of conflict discussed in the first section of the literature review. The literature 
examining conflict in the Delta revolves around three interconnected forms of marginalisation – 
economic, political, and identity group exclusion. Thus the statistical models this study employs 
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will examine the applicability of these marginalisation theories to the Delta and elucidate which 
form of marginalisation has the greatest impact on the justification of, and willingness to engage 
in political violence. This study’s research methodology provides a different perspective on the 
occurrence of political violence by testing the existing paradigms and using public opinion data 
from Afrobarometer. Thus the statistical models analysed in this study will be used to assess the 
validity of general conflict theories, applied to the Delta region.  
1.4.Methodology Overview: 
 
Despite the literature’s comprehensive explanation for violence in the Delta, there is an absence 
of quantitative methodology being utilised to test the power of these existing theories. This cross 
sectional study, using survey data from Afrobarometer, assesses respondents’ perceptions of 
political, economic, and group marginalisation and the extent to which these perceived 
marginalisations influence the willingness to participate in, and justify, political violence.  Two 
questions, discussed in more detail in the following chapter, will be used to measure participants’ 
justification of, and willingness to participate, in political violence.  
 
The software programme SPSS will be utilised to analyse the data set. The data set is comprised 
of the responses from the 2003 Afrobarometer survey, which has a sample size of 2,428 
participants, divided across all states. For the purpose of this research, the dataset was adjusted to 
reflect responses from those respondents residing in the Niger Delta states. Although there are nine 
states that make up the Delta region, the dataset contains no respondents from Imo state. 
Furthermore, two respondents who responded that they work for state security services were 
removed so as to ensure only ‘civilian’ (as defined earlier as non-state security personnel) 
responses were included in the analysis. Thus, the sample size is 665, without excluding missing 
cases. However, according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program, only one ‘conflict’ death was 
recorded between 1998 and 2004 in Imo. Although death is not the only measure of political 
violence, Imo state appears to have experienced less politically motivated violence then the rest of 
the region, as measured by number of active militants (Ajayi, 2013).  
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“Round Two”  data from 2003 was used due to methodological and conceptual reasons. From a 
methodological perspective, the 2003 survey was the only round of Afrobarometer surveys that 
included ethnicity marginalisation variables, which related to two questions regarding attitudes 
towards political violence engagement. Moreover, on a conceptual level, Delta violence reached a 
peak in the immediate years 2003-2005 following the survey collection. This is reflected by 
quantitative and qualitative assessments of Delta violence levels depicted by the number of deaths, 
infrastructure damage and corporate kidnappings (Mähler, 2010).  
 
Univariate data (Mean, Mode, Standard deviation, etc.) is presented before the multivariate 
analysis phase, as ‘descriptive statistics’ contextualises marginalisation and political violence 
attitudes within the sample.  For all variables used in this analysis, I removed the ‘missing cases’ 
in a list-wise fashion, for people who refused to respond also indicated that they do not know how 
to respond to the particular question. This is done to ensure a single sample for all analysis.  
Regression Models, as well as independent variables within these models, are considered 
significant at p values less than 0.05. All variables slated to be included in an index with greater 
than four items will undergo factor analysis to determine latent variables in addition to reliability 
tests of any scales created. 
 
I am assuming Niger Delta inhabitants, based on the literature, are making comparisons to other 
regions. Although not all Afrobarometer questions are asking respondents to compare conditions, 
the responses, whatever they are, are being compared to the conditions of other Nigerians, notably 
those outside of the Delta. This is done to grasp the comparative aspect of perceptions of  
marginalisation. 
 
It is possible the percentage of respondents that stated they would justify or participate in political 
violence was under reported due to the nature of survey data. This because respondents may be 
fearful of repercussions should they admit to participating in, or justifying, incidents of political 
violence. 48.8 percent of the sample size believed that the interviewer was sent by a government 
entity. Thus another limitation of this study is that the number of respondents admitting to 
participation, or justification, may be under represented due to fear of punitive measures on behest 
of the government (Holbrook, Krosnick,& Pfent, 2007). 
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1.5 Hypothesis justification   
 
1.5.1 
 
H₁: As perceptions of political marginalisation increase, respondents are more likely to 
justify and engage in political violence. 
 
Political marginalisation has been a recurrent independent variable in political science literature 
used to explain events from civil wars to riots and terrorism. Following Gurr’s (1993) quantitative 
study showing that political marginalisation is one of the causal variables that can explain the onset 
of civil war, Wimmer, Cederman, & Min (2009) used ethnicity as a proxy for political exclusion 
to argue that states in which ethnic marginalisation (and thus political marginalisation) are 
prevalent are prone to civil wars, compared to states without a politically excluded population. 
Furthermore, they assert that a politically-excluded population is often the party that initiates the 
violence at the civil war’s onset. The main causal linkage between violence and marginalisation 
has been discussed in literature and is often boiled down into two forms – the rational actor model 
and a seemingly emotional model.  
 
“From one perspective, protesters are in a sense irrational, lashing out because they are 
alienated, frustrated, and/or have been cut-off from the mechanisms that integrate most 
people into the political arena of a liberal democracy. From the other perspective, protesters 
are calculating political actors who assemble the evidence, question the assumptions of 
liberal democracy, and choose to respond to delegitimized state violence with their own 
violence” (White, 2000, p.104).  
 
Regardless of either model there is a clear link between marginalisation and the expression of 
politically motivated violent mobilisations. Politically excluded individuals, by definition, do not 
have the ability, incentives or resources to express political desires and grievances through legal 
or legitimate channels, or all these legal avenues have been exhausted. As such, this population 
has no legitimate or sanctioned avenue to engage with a country’s political elites and is forced to 
resort to alternative means to voice political grievances. As Mähler (2010, p.26) states,  
 
“Especially for the younger generations, the “lesson” of the Ogoni protests in the middle 
of the 1990s is that peaceful protest does not produce any positive results. As the transition 
to democracy, which was associated with a lot of expectations and hope for improvement 
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of the socioeconomic situation, has been largely disappointing, the people’s willingness to 
use violence has been further strengthened.”  
 
Thus even without a comparison to another group’s circumstances, it appears that politically 
excluded individuals may feel incentivised to engage in political violence (Ukeje, 2001).  
 
However the nature of political exclusion varies according to the experiences of different groups 
or sects of a country’s population. This will have varying effects on the population in question. Le 
Billon notes the potential effect of a widening wealth and power gap between social classes and 
its relationship to spurring the potential for violent retaliation among the aggrieved classes.   
 
As the wealth and power gap between the ruling and the ruled increases, so does the 
frustration of marginalised groups seeing political change as the only avenue for satisfying 
their greed and aspirations, or expressing their grievances. In the absence of widespread 
political consensus — which cannot be maintained solely through a distribution of rents 
and repression — violence becomes for these groups the main, if not only route to wealth 
and power (Le Billion, 2001, p.567).  
 
Therefore, a perceived inequality can lead individuals or groups to mobilize and partake in political 
violence borne out of resentment for segments of the population that are perceived to be better off 
compared to the disenfranchised group; although the violence may not target the advantaged group 
(Gurr, 2006).  
 
After the 1956 discovery of oil in the Delta, which led to the reduced power of Delta political 
structures – as the federal government sought complete control over the oil revenue and thus the 
political landscape –  violent incidents perpetually increased until the Delta was transformed into 
an “outright unstable region with persistent violence since the 1990s” (Idemudia & Ite, 2005, 
p.392). The region’s exclusion from substantial political decision-making and the stark political 
and wealth inequalities spurred mobilisation and subsequent violence in the Delta as the politically 
marginalised had no political capacity to contest the federal government’s resource wealth 
allocation policies. As such, violence targeting government interests was the only logical recourse 
for inhabitants seeking to increase their socioeconomic and political status (Wimmer, Cederman, 
& Min, 2009). Therefore, increased perceptions of marginalisation should correlate with greater 
propensity to participate in, and justify political violence. Thus my model takes into account the 
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political marginalisation and political violence relationship irrespective of the mechanism; as my 
model accounts for both the perceived inequality of political power directly causing violence and 
violence as the only viable communication tool through the blocking of legitimate political 
channels.   
 
Finally, the infamous Niger Delta militant groups the NDPVF and MEND have both issued 
communiques arguing for increased regional autonomy (Mähler, 2010). While this could be a ploy 
to gain political legitimacy, if the organisations were simply criminal and motivated by economic 
gains I am unable to see the rationale behind these statements. Furthermore, neither group has 
attempted to manipulate ethnic divisions within marginalised ethnicities in the Delta; as such, this 
indicates the groups’ involvement in violence is indeed motivated by political grievances.  
 
1.5.2 
H₂: As perceptions of economic marginalisation increase, respondents are more likely to justify 
and engage in political violence. 
 
Economic exclusion and wealth inequality have been a prominent theme in literature explaining 
violent events both inside and outside the Niger Delta. Although poverty on its own does not 
automatically lead to violence, economic inequalities have long been associated with political 
violence, as first popularized by Ted Gurr in 1970. Although the economic inequality component 
of the onset of violence is still debated in the broad conflict literature, it is an appropriate and 
necessary concept to include in my model as we can test how the theory applies to a specific case. 
 
When applied to the Niger Delta, the stark contrast of the economic and development conditions 
between the rest of the country and the Delta states is obvious. Furthermore, the impoverished 
Delta inhabitants are well aware the luxury they see in other parts of the country not only comes 
from their area, but has come at a cost to the region's inhabitants in the form of environmental 
degradation leading to a loss in economic opportunities (Tobor, 2016). It seems almost impossible 
that Delta inhabitants will not compare their economic status and wealth generation opportunities 
to the rest of the country and will most likely have strong perceptions of economic marginalisation 
due to the region’s comparative (and absolute) lack of development. 
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I am sceptical of the argument that political movements are often concealments for advancing 
economic opportunities (Wimmer, Cederman,& Min, B. 2009). Testing both the indicators for 
economic and political marginalisation will shed light on this proposition to test individual effects 
of each concept on violence. I expect that increased perceptions of economic marginalisation will 
correlate with a higher propensity for one to engage in, and justify political violence due to the 
economic inequalities prevalence in both Niger Delta specific and general literature. and my 
agreement with the relative deprivation hypothesis applied to the Delta as several scholars have 
done qualitatively. 
 
1.5.3 
 
H₃: As perceptions of marginalisation of one’s identity groups increases, one is more likely to 
justify and engage in political violence. 
 
Some literature cites ethnicity as a proxy for identity group, which can affect an individual’s 
willingness to justify and engage in politically-motivated violence. Although 66.6 percent of 
respondent’s identified ethnicity as their primary identity group, this hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that any identity group will have the same effect as ethnicity on attitudes towards the 
justifications and participations concerning political violence. However, ethnicity as a driver of 
violence has been one of the most controversial factors when explaining manifestations of conflict 
and violence. Scholars deliberate its role, and while there is consensus that violence is not an 
intrinsic consequence of an ethnically diverse polity, ethnic cleavages in conjunction with other 
stimulating factors can manifest as ethnic conflict. Therefore, ethnic marginalisation is an 
important control variable in my analysis of the Delta. 
 
Ethnic animosities can be exacerbated by political divisions and elite manipulation, but are also 
affected by political and economic differences between ethnic groups in Nigeria (Obi, 2009). 
Nigerian politicians have made ethnic cleavages salient (Courson, 2011; Tobor, 2016) and hence 
we can expect people who belong to various ethnic groups to compare their own political and 
socioeconomic conditions with other groups’.  
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Economist Frances Stewart is the main proponent of the importance of horizontal inequalities. 
Regardless of how groups are defined, “differences between groups... can cause deep resentment 
that may lead to violent struggles” (Stewart, 2011, p.1). Stewart argues political, economic, and 
societal divisions are the differences that are most likely to lead a group to participate in acts of 
goal oriented violence. Although Østby (2013) and Stewart (2011) argue absolute poverty is not a 
significant causal variable, relative poverty in unequal societies, (in addition to the other forms of 
exclusion) should correlate with disenfranchised communities partaking in violence aimed at 
changing the status quo. While the authors of these theories were not speaking specifically about 
violence in the Niger Delta, scholars seeking to explain the continued bouts of violence towards 
corporate and national interests have modified and applied these theories in their work as discussed 
in the previous section of the literature review. 
 
Stewart’s concept of horizontal inequality postulates that the intergroup comparison is a stronger 
predictor of violence due to psychological ties to a group, which provides incentives for collective 
action (Stewart, 2011). Although ethnicity in Nigeria is a proxy for socio-economic status and the 
associated lived experiences, and there are no primordial differences between ethnic groups, due 
to the apparent marginalisation of people, denial of groups certain  political and economic rights 
and resources, Stewart’s horizontal inequality hypothesis may be appropriate to predict that 
identity marginalisation variable will be a significant predictor of political violence attitudes in the 
Delta.  
 
However, there is a need to distinguish whether participants are motivated by grievances against 
other ethnic groups in the Delta  per se, or the ethnicities of the ruling elites. Thus, I apply theories 
specific to ethnicity to group identity in general and assume the same causal logic that applies to 
an ethnic group’s willingness to participate in political violence holds true for any other identity 
group listed by Afrobarometer. It should be noted identity group marginalisation is a separate 
concept from identity group versus Nigerian nationality prioritisation and this hypothesis applies 
to the former concept of group marginalisation.  
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1.6 Significance of the Study  
 Since the 1960’s scholars have debated the causal factors behind civil war, terrorism, destructive 
protests and other forms of political violence. The literature is mainly divided into motivation – 
such as greed or grievance (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) –  and opportunity; as exemplified by the 
repressiveness of a state’s security apparatus (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Obi, 2009). The latter views 
political violence resulting from the relative strength of the state vis a vis the society, and the 
willingness and/or ability of the state to quell political violence incidents (Awodola & Ayuba, 
2015). This study is concerned with the factors that affect the justification of, and willing to 
participate in political violence, and thus the literature pertaining to opportunity will not be 
addressed. The extent of state repression may affect public motivation to engage in political 
violence, which will be addressed in this study. 
 
Poverty, social and political exclusion, and opportunity coupled with greed have all been used to 
explain motivations behind various forms of political violence generally (Østby, 2013), and and 
these arguments have also been used to explain violence in the Niger Delta. However, there has 
been a failure in the Delta literature to establish whether a clear causal link exists between 
marginalisation and an outcome of political violence (Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2008). Furthermore, 
as noted earlier, the majority of Delta scholars work under the assumption that marginalisation is 
a real world concept and do not measure individual perceptionss marginalisation. There could be 
a case where a group is objectively marginalized; however, if that group does not feel or perceive 
themselves to be marginalised, then marginalisation as an independent variable that explains 
political violence falls short. The few studies that have attempted to measure marginalisation and 
its effect on political violence participation, have used sub-par items to operationalise different 
concepts of exclusion (Smith, et al., 2012).  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) and Gini Coefficient measure levels of poverty and 
inequality. However, one cannot assume that these reflect marginalisation. This is because 
perceptions towards marginalisation are subjective to individuals (Østby, 2013). The 
aforementioned variables and other popular quantitative measures of ‘marginalisation’ cannot 
capture whether or not the population actually feels marginalised as they do not measure public 
attitudes towards their economic position. Numbers are assigned simply based on living conditions 
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and other ‘measurable’ aspects that these items attempt to quantify. Furthermore, the literature that 
uses these variables assumes that everyone who has the same number of some variable, i.e. a low 
rating on the Human Development Index, feels the same way towards their environment, such as 
government authorities, and thus experiences the same degree of marginalisation (Østby, 2013). 
Additionally, Thiesen (2008) argues that economic indicators are poor predictors of political 
violence when compared interview data concerning participants’ subjective perceptions of their 
living conditions.  
 
While these studies provide useful quantitative and comparative data, they are unable to assess 
how people discern and navigate through socio-political world.  Thus my study uses opinion data 
on public opinion to understand what is driving behaviour in the Delta region. The study shall 
elucidate how people living in the region interpret the extent of their marginalisation and whether 
their understandings of marginalisation cause a justification of, and participation in incidents of 
political violence. 
 
Despite the wealth of literature on the Niger Delta’s lengthy conflict history, no studies I am aware 
of have used data sets from survey responses to test the factors that influence inclination among 
citizens to participate in, and justify acts of political violence. Although Tobor (2016) conducts 
several interviews with former Niger Delta militants, the number of interviews is too low for a 
statistical application. Furthermore, the interviews are aimed at contributing to the qualitative body 
of literature on the Delta. Thus, this study contributes to knowledge on understanding the Delta 
region by measuring public opinion on marginalisation and predisposition to engage in, and justify 
political violence.  
 
Finally, much of the data pertaining to conflict in general, and to the Delta region specifically, can 
be unreliable due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information in a conflict-ridden area. 
Despite the best efforts of data gathering campaigns conducted by NGOs, universities, 
governments and think tanks obtaining ‘hard’ or non-psychological variables used to quantify 
concepts, such as the nature of violence, levels of economic development or living conditions, the 
gathered information is often inaccurate (Mähler, 2010). Thus, due to largely unreliable data 
concerning incidents of violence, measuring justification of, and willingness to participate in 
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political violence (this study’s dependent variables) may provide a more concrete understanding 
of political violence dynamics in the Delta. 
 
Measuring the effects of political versus economic or social marginalisation will be valuable to 
decision-makers looking to design policies to address a specific form of marginalisation and its 
effects (Awodola & Ayuba, 2015).This study aims to bridge the gap between Delta-specific 
theories and more generalised theories of political violence. I do this by applying general theories 
of marginalisation to the Delta context. I test relative deprivation inspired theories for their 
applicability to a selected case and Delta-specific theories that use marginalisation as a real world 
concept. Thus a brief review of literature regarding non-Delta specific literature is provided below. 
 
Poverty is one of the oldest theories in modern social science that has been used to explain political 
violence. Given prominence by Samuel Huntington, economic exclusion has been utilised to 
explain political violence incidents in the 1970’s in the United States and Southeast Asia (Piazza, 
2006).  Furthermore, poverty was centre stage after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the 
United States, and policy-makers went on to stress the necessity of economic development in the 
Global South to prevent transnational terrorism and other forms of politically motivated attacks 
(Piazza, 2006). As the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in regards to both 
transnational and domestic terrorism and associated political violence, “No one in this world can 
be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived...Low levels of economic 
and social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political violence 
and instability” (cited in Piazza, 2006, p.159-160).   
 
In a large sample size study pertaining to incidents of terrorism, Piazza (2006) concludes that 
poverty and inequality, as measured by several economic variables, are not statistically significant 
predictors of political grievance-inspired terrorism. Although the Piazza study’s chief concern is 
terrorism, terrorism is a form of violence that is done with the aim of achieving a political outcome 
and therefore it can be classified as a form of political violence (Gurr, 2010; Mähler, 2010). 
Krueger & Maleckova (2002) allege that poverty, among other factors, is not a significant causal 
mechanism of political violence. Krueger & Maleckova conducted interviews with Palestinians 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds and found that education and income have no effect 
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on how the participants in the study felt towards attacks (conducted by Palestinians) that killed 
Israeli civilians. Collier & Hoeffler (2004), however, argue that poverty, or individual/communal 
grievances, are insufficient factors to explain political violence, when compared to economic-
based motivators – such as perceived socioeconomic disparities. However, this argument has been 
largely contested when applied to a sub-Saharan Africa context (Dumas, 2002; (Østby, 2013). 
Hence, whilst these authors contend that poverty alone is not a substantial explanatory variable in 
the general literature concerning political violence, a society’s degree of inequality is said to have 
an effect. 
 
Relative Deprivation Theory, popularized by Ted Gurr’s 1970 book Why Men Rebel, has been a 
highly influential and contested theory for over 45 years. Gurr argues that dissatisfaction with life 
circumstances arises when an individual compares his or her life circumstances, or the 
circumstances of the group to which he/she belongs, to other individuals or groups that are 
relatively perceived to be better off society (Awodola & Ayubam, 2015; Gurr, 1970). Although 
the theory was originally concerned with economic parameters, scholars eventually applied the 
concept to include social and political elements. As Gurr stated, “People become resentful and 
disposed to political action when they share a collective perception that they are unjustly deprived 
of economic and political advantages or opportunities enjoyed by other groups" (Gurr, 2006, p.87). 
This fuels the desire for mobilisation and subsequent episodes of political violence (Awodola & 
Ayuba 2015; Gurr, 2006). The theory suggests that inequality – namely the perception of 
inequality – spurs the sense of relative deprivation in a society (Gurr, 2006). Gurr argued that 
societies that possess a segment(s) of society that perceives themselves to be politically and/or 
economically disadvantaged are prone to civil war compared to an egalitarian polity (Gurr, 1993).  
Other studies, such as that of Richardson (2013) have extended this argument, stating that other 
forms of inequalities in a society have the potential to lead to violence of a political nature 
(Richardson, 2013). Furthermore, Tilly (1978) also argued that the ability and willingness of the 
state’s security apparatus to engage in repressive action is a strong determinant of citizen-driven 
political violence; as the citizenry is responding the same violent manner toward the state. 
  
In a review of primarily quantitative literature pertaining to political violence, Østby (2013) 
observed that many academics tend to refute relative-deprivation as  salient in explaining political 
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violence. However, she found that many studies’ measured vertical inequality instead of horizontal 
inequality, which was less salient. Østby contests that these studies are simply comparing 
individuals and not comparing inequalities across groups. As Stewart (2008) stated, if a group or 
community perceives that they are faring worse than other groups, the group may be driven to 
‘rebel’, or mobilise in a violent manner.  
 
The Niger Delta is renowned for corruption, conflict and oil. British colonial rule marked the Delta 
region loss of its economic livelihood –  as it no longer had the ability to control trade through the 
area’s waterways – and political autonomy (Idemudia & Ite 2005). As the colonial government 
invested in cash crops in other regions of Nigeria, the Delta’s economic relevance, and thus its 
political importance and influence, also degraded. Following the discovery of oil and the economic 
gains beginning in the 1950, various Delta groups have demanded autonomy from the federal 
government and increased oil and natural gas revenue percentages. However, these demands were 
often ignored (Ikelegbe, 2005). This led to the creation of various militant groups that attacked 
state and multinational corporate natural resource interests in combination with widespread civil 
unrest (Obi, 2009) with violence peaking in 2004 and 2005 (Courson, 2011). As follows,  
 
1.7 Summary of Chapter 1 
 
This chapter set out to provide a background of non-state security personnel-driven political 
violence in the nine states that comprise the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Additionally, the 
literature that explains political within the Delta was reviewed in addition to more general theories 
of political violence. As this study aims to investigate the relationship between political, economic 
and identity group marginalisation with the justification of, and willingness to participate in, 
political violence. 
 
1.7.1  
Chapter 2 provides a thorough methodological overview of the thesis, including the justification 
of the data set. This chapter elaborates on the research design in terms of the operationalisation 
and computation of the variables for political, economic and ethnic marginalisation that are 
analysed subsequently in the regression models is outlined in this chapter.  
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1.7.2  
Chapter 3 provides a final analysis and discussion on the results of both regression models as well 
as some final conclusions on what the models may tell us about political violence in the Delta 
region. The results are contextualised within the existing marginalisation theories. The 
applicability of this theories to the Delta is then discussed, followed by the dissertation’s 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an explanation of the operationalisation of the key concepts used in this 
study: political, economic and identity group marginalisation. It also illuminates the study’s use of 
control variables. The extent to which each variable impacts on propensity to justify or engage in 
political violence is tested using regression models to explain why roughly a third of the 
respondents for both dependent variable questions (elaborated below) have predispositions to 
justify and/or engage in political violence.  
 
To test the relative strength of each variable, indices (also known as ‘scales’ or ‘composite 
variables’) were formed via a combination of theory and factor and reliability analyses. This was 
to ascertain the appropriate items intended for use in both primary and control variable indices. 
All the indices used in this study are computed as an average of the scores of the individual 
variables included in the scale. One cause of concern to some may be the way in which the study 
indexes political marginalisation. This is because the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI) is 
comprised of questions measuring one’s contact with a government official, and not perceived 
political marginalisation per se. I assume that these six aspects measure elements of perceived 
political marginalisation. Using a factor and reliability analysis   twelve variables that captured 
other aspects of political exclusion were excluded from the analysis. Two of these excluded 
variables -- the perceived ability to make elected representatives listen to grievances, the extent to 
which one is interested in politics -- were rather included in the regression models. These items 
were deemed appropriate for inclusion based on theoretical grounds, which will be elaborated on 
later in this chapter. Furthermore, with the exception of dummy variables and the items that 
measure government contact, all variables that measure an aspect of political exclusion have been 
recoded so that higher numbers indicate a higher degree of marginalisation. 
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Unlike the case for political marginalisation, the ‘round two’ Afrobarometer questionnaire 
contains over 50 questions that measuring aspects of economic marginalisation, which were used 
to create the Economic Marginalisation Index (EMI). I disaggregated these items into three 
categories of perceived economic marginalisation. The first category is personal or household 
economic marginalisation; second is personal or household wealth (monetary); and third is the 
degree to which there is an absence of ‘development’, in terms of access to basic infrastructure for 
service delivery, in the sampling area. The variables intended to be included in each economic 
marginalisation category were subject to three separate factor and reliability analyses.  
 
The following chapter describes the methodological and theoretical rationales behind each of the 
variables’ inclusion in the regression models, which measure the relationship between the 
perceived marginalisation and other potential control variables on attitudes towards condoning or 
participating in political violence. The chapter accounts for the theoretical and conceptual 
justifications behind the items’ inclusion, index and variable operationalisation and finally the 
index computation. 
2.2 Theoretical Justifications for Main Variables  
This section provides justification for the inclusion of each of the following variables in the 
regression models. To this end, both theoretical and practical reasons are provided.  
 
As elaborated on in the section of the chapter dealing with operationalisation, a respondent’s 
disposition towards political violence is broken down into two separate variables: ‘Political 
Violence Justification’ and ‘Political Violence Participation’. ‘Political Violence Participation’ 
measures one’s propensity to participate in political violence, while ‘Political Violence 
Justification’ captures respondents’ propensity to endorse violence to attain a political goal. I 
assess the factors influencing one’s propensity to believe political violence is justified. I posit that 
an analysis of these factors will provide insight into the motivation behind participation in 
violence. Like Boyle (2002) and Du Toit (1990) this study assumes one must believe his/her 
violent act to be justified, or legitimate, before a person engages in what they conceive as a violent 
political act (O'Boyle, 2002). Thus reasons for investigating justification attitudes, opposed to 
solely the willingness to participate in political violence, are warranted. I disaggregated political 
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violence into two concepts because the dataset contained two questions regarding political 
violence. While each question’s vernacular is stated in the operationalisation portion of this 
chapter, it can also be found in the Afrobarometer Questionnaire section of the Appendix. 
 
2.2.1 Political Marginalisation 
 
Although Afrobarometer does not have a question with the wording of political exclusion, 
alienation, or marginalisation, there exist several sets of questions that relate to, or are a symptom 
of, political marginalisation. After carefully analysing the 2003 Afrobarometer questionnaire for 
Nigeria, eight ‘question sets’ were selected pertaining to the overall concept of political 
marginalisation. Overall these question sets comprise 22 individual questions, or items, analysed 
via an exploratory factor analysis to create a composite variable for political marginalisation that 
was slated to be termed the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI). 
 
The first question analysed by the exploratory factor analysis asked respondents how interested 
they are in public affairs. The rationale for inclusion into the PMI is that a lack of interest in politics 
may be a symptom of political marginalisation. If a person feels like they have no political voice, 
there is reason to believe that they have less interest in public or political affairs, as they do not 
feel that they affect their lives directly. Alternatively, a lack of a political voice may increase the 
respondent’s willingness to engage with political topics due to frustration (Leysens,2004; Lipset, 
1959). This variable is termed ‘Interest in Public Affairs’. 
 
The second item included in the PMI measures the perceived ability of respondents to make elected 
representatives listen to their demands. The ability, or lack thereof, is part of the definition of 
political marginalisation as according to Bratton (2012) when there is an excluded group who has 
little to no say in political matters, it is likely to lead to a dissatisfied citizenry (Bratton, 2012). 
This item is labelled the ‘Perceived Ability to Make Public Officials Listen’. 
 
The third set of items is derived from a ten-part question that measures how often the respondent 
contacts government officials. The options range from local government entities to traditional 
rulers. These items were selected because the propensity of someone to contact a party official is 
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likely to be dependent on an individual’s perceived level of political marginalisation. According 
to Hirlinger (1992) it is unlikely that an individual or group would take the time to contact 
government officials if there is no benefit to be derived. There are factors which influence whether 
or not someone has contacted one someone holding political office. These include whether a 
person had time to do so or the extent of difficulty in establishing contact with that particular 
person or state office. If a citizen is required to travel a day to contact their local government 
councillor, as opposed to a few hours travel time, I posit this may serve as deterrent. This position 
is based on Hirlinger’s (1992) research concerning citizen-initiated contact with local political 
figures. This would then negate the variable as a potential symptom of political marginalisation. 
However, there is no question in the Afrobarometer questionnaire that is able to provide clarity. 
As such, lack of contact, or less contact is assumed to be a symptom of political marginalisation. 
This set of items is termed ‘Contact with Government Officials’3. 
 
The next question selected for the PMI asks how often Nigerians believe they are treated unequally 
by the legal system. People who are politically marginalised are assumed to be unlikely to receive 
equal legal treatment because there is no pressure on the legal system to treat them fairly, or there 
is no punishment for justice system officials that promulgate unfair treatment (Highton, 1997). As 
Highton (1997) states, if marginalised individuals have de jure equal legal rights, these rights may 
not be afforded to persons de facto, who belong to a marginalised group. Thus, the perceived equal 
or unequal treatment may be viewed as a symptom of political exclusion and explains its inclusion 
in the factor analysis for political marginalisation concept. This variable is titled ‘Perceived Legal 
Inequality’. 
 
The next item examined by factor analysis is ‘Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders’. I referred to a 
question that measured the extent to which a person believes the state responds to, and engages 
with its citizens’ political goals. The extent to which one feels that their voice is being heard by 
political officials is seen as key to operationalising perceptions of political marginalisation in the 
Niger Delta. It is for this reason that this item was analysed by the PMI factor analysis. 
 
 
3 This variable set was recoded to run in a different direction into Perceived Government Contact in order to 
differentiate the directionality of the new variabe 
36 
 
The next variable that measures perceived political marginalisation is titled ‘Perceived Difficulty 
of Voter Registration’. It was selected for the PMI because it asks the respondent to assess their 
the difficulty experienced in an attempt to obtain a voter registration card. This variable was 
included, as governments have been known to use voting legislation and access to stifle political 
dissent (Highton, 1997). 
 
The final question that measures political marginalisation asks whether a person feels close to any 
political organisation or party. This is relevant to feelings of political marginalisation persons who 
do not feel close to a particular party are do not have their interests represented within the electoral 
aspect, or realm, of the political system. Furthermore, those who do not affiliate with a political 
party are acknowledging there is no legitimate political party that represents their interests 
(Erdman, 2007; Lipset 1959). As such, this variable is titled ‘Political Affiliation’. 
 
2.2.2 Economic Marginalisation 
 
Due to varying conceptual aspects of economic marginalisation, as well as the variety of scales 
exhibited by the questions for operationalisation of economic marginalisation, three different 
aspects of economic exclusion have been identified. The first to be discussed is personal economic 
marginalisation. For all items, a higher value corresponds with a greater degree of economic 
marginalisation. Furthermore, all items listed below were analysed via an exploratory factor 
analysis to ensure the PEMI’s validity. This is discussed in the final computation section of this 
chapter. 
 
2.2.3 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) 
 
The first set of variables were examined by factor analysis to determine the appropriate items for 
the creation of the Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) composite variable. The 
question asked the respondent to rate Nigeria’s present economic conditions as well as their own 
living conditions. These conditions, while having the potential to pertain to a variety of factors, 
are likely the effect of one’s income and economic status, which explains their inclusion in the 
PEMI. The next item in this set asks respondents to compare his or her living conditions with those 
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of other Nigerians. This question is phrased in terms of a relative deprivation conceptual 
framework, because it asks the respondent to compare his or her living situation to that of their 
fellow countrymen. This variable set is termed ‘Economic Outlook’. 
 
The next set of items that were included in the PEMI measure how often the respondent has gone 
without certain basic necessities. These necessities range from food to a cash income. Each of the 
items listed, notably a cash income, is dependent on the respondent’s economic position, which 
explains its inclusion in the PEMI. The variable set is labelled ‘Gone Without’. 
 
The final set of items is comprised of questions labelled ‘Perceived Service Availability’. These 
asks respondents to rate the availability of a range of services, such as the level of difficulty of 
obtaining primary school placement, or the ease of attaining police services. These factors were 
included due to access to basic services is being cited often as a symptom of economic 
marginalisation (Alexander, 2010). 
 
2.2.4 Personal Wealth Index (PWI) 
 
The Personal Wealth Index (PWI) measured the individual’s household, or personal, economic 
status. The items that comprise this variable measure the perceived wealth of the respondent in 
addition to the perceived wealth of their parents and children. I expect that previous and future 
wealth perceptions may affect the context in which the respondent views their ability to accrue 
wealth currently. For example, if a one perceives that their parents are more wealthy than they are, 
they may be more likely to feel a sense of injustice or hold negative feelings towards a familiar 
reduction in overall wealth. This would be a perceived injustice, which is appropriate to 
understanding the concept of economic marginalisation.  
 
In addition, the opposite situation applies. If a person believes his or her children are likely to be 
better off in the future, this may decrease perceptions of exclusion. Therefore, should the preceding 
assumptions be correct, the related items will provide a more nuanced operationalisation of 
economic marginalisation.  
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2.2.5 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) 
 
The final aspect of the economic marginalisation concept were derived from questions that 
measure the availability of certain services and facilities in the respondent’s sampling unit. The 
services range from post-offices to supermarkets. The root cause of the presence or absence of one 
of these services may be rooted in macroeconomic factors rooted in the international political 
economy (Alexander, 2010; Courson, 2011). However, the presence or lack of these services are 
also indicative of the region’s level of economic development. Wealthy areas are likely to include 
more of these entities because there is more potential for businesses to profit from wealthy 
communities in addition to wealthy individuals being able to demand certain services, due to 
increased influence. However, this study does not have the capability to measure if the area’s 
economic development is a product of foreign aid, as there were such projects evident in the Delta 
in 2003 (Zalik, 2004). An example is the demand for a recreation facility. Thus this variable is 
termed the Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI). 
 
2.2.6 Identity Group Marginalisation 
 
In the previous chapter, I hypothesised that belonging to a identity group, which perceived 
themselves to be marginalised (as measured from the standpoint of an individual within the group) 
was likely to be correlated with political violence given the lack of power in legal political channels 
(Amaraegbu, 2011; Olojede, 2000). Identity groups range from ethnic to religious identifications. 
Hence, the index was slated to be comprised of two questions that measure the respondent’s 
perceived political and socio-economic status, in relation to other identity groups. Essentially this 
aims to measure the perceived differences between groups – regardless of which identity group 
the respondent identifies with, which is termed horizontal inequality (Stewart, 2010). As Stewart 
argues, perceived group differences or treatment are likely to lead to occurrences of political 
violence. 
2.3 Control Variables 
2.3.1 Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) 
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Swathes of political violence literature argues repressive governments deter violent mobilisation 
by force, and such disproportionate or violent dispersion may create a justification of, and 
willingness to action political violence (Ajayi & Adesote,2013). Hence, trust in Nigeria’s security 
forces is a separate concept to political marginalisation and is included as a control variable. 
Accordingly, a Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) was created. Some authors have argued that 
political violence enacted by non-state actors is often a response to politically repressive regimes 
(Muller & Weede, 1990). It is likely that perceptions of trust towards the state security apparatus 
may influence the likelihood of participation in political violence, as lower trust could indicate the 
respondent – through the rational actor model – would be disincentivized for fear of repercussions 
inflicted by police and/or military units. Therefore, the respondent may perceive the cost of violent 
action as greater if the respondent has low trust in state security forces (Muller & Weede, 1990). 
While this variable may not have a discernible effect on respondents’ attitudes regarding the 
legitimacy of political violence, it may affect how people calculate the benefits and costs of 
participating in politically motivated incidents of violence. 
 
2.3.2 Government Trust Index (GTI) 
 
Levels of trust in government institutions were the next items examined by factor analysis. I 
posited that a lack of trust in government institutions may not spur political violence, how trust in 
political institutions may serve as a deterrent (Muller & Weede, 1990). While a lack of trust in 
government institutions may be a symptom of political marginalisation, a lack of trust in 
institutions may also impact individuals holding favourable attitudes towards participation in 
political violence. As Muller and Weede (1990) assert, one who lacks trust in government is likely 
to view violence as the only means of political expression. Thus levels of vertical trust is may 
affect predispositions towards political violence, hence its inclusion in the model of the PMI.  
 
Whilst there is ample political science literature that addresses institutional trust, on the one hand 
(Newton, Stolle, & Zmerli, 1999) and political marginalisation on the other (Hall, 1999; Gurr, 
2006; Osaghae, 1995; Oskarason, 2010; Piazza, 2006), they are often viewed as separate concepts 
that do not influence one other (Gberevbie, Oyeyemi & Excellence-Oluye, 2014). Only a few 
scholars have looked at the relationship between institutional trust and factors that may affect trust, 
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such as accountability and good governance. For this reason, levels of vertical trust should not be 
included in the PMI. However, as an additional check the above mentioned ‘government trust’ 
variables were examined by the PMI factor analysis. Accordingly, an institutional trust index was 
created, which is explained later in this chapter. However, these variables were not included in the 
PMI. This scale forms the Government Trust Index (GTI). As discussed in this chapter’s results 
section the GTI is was not included in the PMI due to the PMI’s pattern matrix factor loadings, 
combined with the separation of the concepts of ‘Trust’ and ‘Marginalisation’ in the literature. 
 
2.3.4 Government Performance Index (GPI) 
 
The Government Performance Index (GPI) measures opinions of how the government has handled 
a variety of issues, ranging from job creation to HIV/AIDS management campaigns. If government 
performance was rated highly, I posited that an individual would be less likely to attempt to disrupt 
the political system that they believe is benefiting the country. Although it is unlikely that persons 
who are politically or economically marginalised would rate government performance as high, one 
who gives a low rating does not necessarily entail that person is marginalised. As such, these items 
were compiled into an index, but function as a control variable, as opposed to functioning as 
elements of political or economic marginalisation. I argue that the extent to which one rates 
government performance as high has the ability to affect the extent to which one might endorse 
and/or participate in political violence. there was a need to control for this variable because an 
individual is unlikely to retaliate against a government that he or she believes is not performing 
well.  
 
2.3.5 Age 
 
The next variable to be controlled for is ‘Age’. In literature that encompasses both generalised 
theories and Delta-specific theories explaining the motivating factors behind political violence, 
age is a recurrent factor. While the causal mechanisms behind the effect of age on political violence 
dispositions are multifaceted and often disputed, the majority of scholars argue that youths are 
more likely than non-youths to engage in political violence (Obi, 2009; Ukeje, 2001). Common 
theories underscore the fact the youths are often relatively deprived compared to the rest of society, 
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as they often have less economic resources and accumulated wealth. One reason provided in the 
literature is that youths have had less time to generate income (Ukeje, 2001). Additionally, Okafor 
(2011) argues that Nigeria’s high youth unemployment rates are a contributing factor to political 
violence and the country’s political stability.  Various studies conceptualise age differently and set 
varying ranges to define and conceptualize youth. Thus, while unemployment rates are not directly 
analysed, the disproportionate amount of unemployment among the country’s youth is a 
justification for why age affects political violence, as unemployed youth  may be aggrieved and 
have more time to engage in political violence (Okafor, 2011).  Participants in the interview sample 
are required to be persons over the age of eighteen. I do not define an upper age boundary for the 
youth, but posit that younger people are more likely to justify and have a willingness to participate 
in political violence in comparison to older people.  
 
2.3.6 Head of Household 
 
The next control variable is ‘Head of Household’. The questionnaire asked whether an individual 
is the head of their household. I surmised that one who is the head of his or her households would 
be less likely than others to have favourable attitude toward political violence. Typically, the head 
of the household is responsible for welfare of that household and hence, are more likely to 
contemplate the risks associated with such violence. This is based on Inglehart and Welzel’s 
scholarship, which argues humans are likely to prioritise basic survival needs and security over 
higher, or more abstract and complex political goals (2009). Whilst this is accepted, the adverse 
view is also held, where a head of a household may also feel more inclined to partake in a violent 
action that they believe will benefit the household in the long term. I posit that  this view may be 
underpinned by the perception of responsibility. Thus, literature suggests that ‘Head of Household’ 
is relevant to both regression models. 
 
2.3.7 Gender 
 
Several studies focused on violence and conflict have documented female participation in political 
violence (Coulter, Persson, & Utas, 2008). However, most of the literature relevant to the Niger 
Delta emphasizes the participation of men in political violence, both in relation to involvement in 
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militias or counter-insurgency, such as MEND or the NDPVF. While this literature, concerning 
regarding the higher propensity of men vs women to participate in violent conflict or political 
violence, may be bias in failing to capture women’s participation in political violence, it makes a 
strong case to include a gender control variable in my model regarding genders influence on 
political violence attitudes. This variable is termed ‘Gender’. 
 
2.3.8 Identity Group Prioritisation 
 
The final variable included in this analysis is labelled ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’. This 
measures the extent of attachment to Nigeria’s national identity versus the other identity groups as 
one’s primary identity marker. As has been mentioned prior, the identity group options offered by 
the Afrobarometer questionnaire include gender and age, and ethnicity and religion. These identity 
markers form a separate variable to the abovementioned ‘identity group marginalisation’ concept, 
as the item does not attempt to measure the degree of marginalisation perceived by the respondent. 
For this reason I exclude it from the ‘Identity Group Marginalisation’ concept and because it 
measures which group the respondent feels a stronger affiliation with. However, identity group 
prioritisation does portend to attitudes surrounding political violence. Following Idemudia & Ite 
(2005) who write about the effects of ethnic group identities on feelings of marginalisation and 
which result in violence against the state; I surmise that individuals who prioritise a group identity 
over national identity are more likely to engage in violent acts against the state. Alternatively, if 
they do not feel that they are part of the nation state’s societal fabric, may be disincentivised to 
engage in political violence (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Watts, 2004). Prioritising national identity 
can one’s propensity to want to engage in political violence against the state (Olojede, 2000). 
Furthermore, in a potentially spurious relationship, people who feel more attached to their group 
identity may feel this way because they have been marginalised by the state. Therefore, we need 
to control for which identity group a respondent associates most strongly with.  
2.4 Operationalisation  
 
2.4.1 Political Violence Justification 
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The first dependent variable used in the linear regression model is whether one feels that violence 
is ever justified in support of a political cause. The survey question asked respondents if they 
‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’ with Statements ‘A’ and ‘B’. Statement ‘A’ reads, “The use of 
violence is never justified in Nigerian politics,” whilst Statement ‘B’ reads “In this country, it is 
sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” This variable was coded from 1-
4 with higher values corresponding to positive views towards political violence. As such the 
variable was labelled as follows: 1= Strongly Agree with Statement A; 2=Agree with Statement 
A; 3= Agree with Statement B; 4= Strongly Agree with statement B. The respondents who agreed 
with neither statement (3.1 percent) were removed from the sample. Although this variable is 
ordinal, it was treated as continuous within the linear regression model. Accordingly, this variable 
is labelled ‘Political Violence Justification’. 
Political Violence Participation 
 
The second dependent variable used to measure ‘political violence justification’ was 
operationalised using five response options to a question that asked whether a person had, or 
would, “use violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The options ranged from, “No, 
would never do this”,” “No, but would do if had the chance”,  “Yes, once or twice”, “Yes, several 
times” and “Yes, often”. This variable was split into a nominal variable, where “No, would never 
do this” was coded ‘0’ with the rest of the options recoded to ‘1’. Whilst this coding may detract 
from the variance in response, it made both methodological and conceptual sense. The reason 
being is that this study investigates the driving factors behind what leads people to have the 
inclination to participate in political violence.  With this variable altered, they either have the desire 
or do not. Hence,  using a logistic regression model brings forth the variables that increase the 
likelihood of a respondent ‘having’ the desire to participate in acts of political violence. Therefore, 
“No, but would do if had the chance,” was included in the category to represent whether one is 
inclined to participate in political violence as these respondents have the ambition but may have 
lacked the opportunity. The other respondents in this category explicitly stated they have 
participated in political violence episodes. This variable is termed ‘Political Violence 
Participation’. 
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While both variables measure separate aspects of opinions surrounding political violence, I group 
the questions together under the singular conceptual term of attitudes (disposition, propensity, 
inclinations, views, etc.), towards political violence.  
 
2.4.2 Political Marginalisation 
 
All variables intended for inclusion in the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI) were recoded  so 
that higher numerical values for the variable corresponded with a higher degree of political 
marginalisation. Hence, all variables evaluated by the factor analysis were recoded so that their 
values ranged from ‘0 to 2’, ‘0 to 3’ or ‘0 to 4’. 
 
 Interest in Public Affairs was operationalised by a question asking, “How interested are you in 
public affairs” (Afrobarometer, 2003). However, the ‘public interest’ variable was excluded from 
the PMI following the factor analysis. This is due to a loading below the .30 factor loading 
coefficient threshold.  
 
The Perceived Ability to Make Elected Officials Listen was measured using the survey question 
asking, “If you had to, you would be able to get together with others to make elected 
representatives listen to your concerns” (Afrobarometer, 2003). This variable was recoded prior to 
a factor analysis. Responses  ranged from ‘0’ (Strongly disagree that the respondent can make 
elected representatives listen) to ‘4’ Strongly Agree that the respondent can make elected 
representatives listen).   
 
Perceived Contact with Government Officials was operationalised by the question, “How often” 
in the past year,  “have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or 
to give them your views” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The response options included were: a local 
government councillor, a state assembly representative, an official in the state governor’s office, a 
National Assembly representative, official of a government ministry, political party official, a 
religious leader, a traditional ruler, an official of village/town development association, and other 
influential person.  
 
45 
 
Although religious leaders, traditional rulers and other influential people were included in the 
options, they are not political entities. Hence these questions were analysed by the factor analysis 
to corroborate my assumption that these items load onto a different factor, as they are not 
measuring engagement with a government or state entity. My assumption proved to be correct. 
Consequently, the value labels for the items concerning the frequency of contact with public 
officials range from ‘0’ (Often) to ‘3’ (Never)4.  Never having contact with political figures is 
presumed to be a function of political marginalisation (Hirlinger, 1992).  The data set did not 
contain data relating to whether a person attempted to contact one of the officials, but was 
unsuccessful but only measured actual contact. Although we do not know why a respondent did 
not engage with the specific official, a reluctance to engage state authority is likely a symptom of 
political exclusion (Hirlinger, 1992). Furthermore, the inability to contact a government official 
may encompass political exclusion. An individual has no reason to contact an official if that person 
believes their concerns will be ignored, as they may perceive that action as being a waste of their 
time. I believe this is a likely scenario, since I assume officials (regardless of what group the 
official belongs to) are more likely to ignore requests from marginalised groups. One reason or 
this is that the excluded groups may have little means to pressure the official or office into 
addressing the marginalised group or individual’s demands. Thus, one of this study’s assumptions 
is that the majority of respondents who did not contact their representatives believed that their 
request would not be addressed. This is why the ‘Never’ option was included at the marginalised 
end of the scale. 
 
‘Perceived Legal Inequality’ was measured by a question asking, “How often are people treated 
unequally under the law” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The values correlated with responses ranged 
from ‘0’ (Never) to ‘3’ (Always) concerning the frequency of unequal treatment under the law. 
 
‘Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders’ was operationalised by a question which inquires to subjects 
if elected leaders (defined as National Assembly members, State Governors or Local Government 
 
4 This variable was recoded after factor analysis into Perceived Government Contact so that higher values 
indicate increased government contact. This was done to increase the ease of understanding the results 
interpretation. 
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Councillors) “try their best to listen to what people like you have to say” (Afrobarometer 2003). 
Once again the numerical values were recoded so they range from 0 (Always) to 3 (Never). 
 
The next variable, i, is operationalised by the question, “Based on your experience, how easy or 
difficult is to obtain... a voter registration card for yourself” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The variable 
was recoded so that a higher numerical value corresponded with a higher degree of 
marginalisation. Hence the variable scale ranged from ‘0’ (Very Easy) to ‘3’ (Very difficult). 
Although 7.3 percent of respondents did not attempt to obtain a voter registration card (which 
could also be seen as a symptom of political exclusion) I recoded these respondents as ‘missing’ 
because we do not know why they did not try to obtain the card. 
 
The final perceived political marginalisation variable, ‘Political Affiliation’ measures an aspect of 
political marginalisation. However, this was not analysed by the PMI factor analysis as it measures 
if respondents, “feel close to any particular political party or political organization” 
(Afrobarometer, 2003). The responses have been recoded to reflect that the people who felt close 
to a party were coded as a ‘0’ while all respondents that stated they felt close to no parties were 
coded ‘1’. Political Affiliation was not examined by the PMI factor analysis due to its 
categorical/nominal coding.  However, its effect on one’s propensity to endorse or engage in 
political violence was analysed in the final regression models. 
 
2.4.3 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) 
 
The Economic Outlook variables were measured by the responses to seven questions. The first 
two questions asked that the respondent rate Nigeria’s present economic conditions and then his 
or her own present living conditions. The third question asked respondents to compare their living 
conditions with those of other Nigerians. The fourth and fifth questions required the respondent to 
compare their present living and economic conditions to twelve months ago. The final two items 
measured the respondents’ attitude toward their future living and economic conditions and whether 
the believed that in the next twelve months their economic predicament would improve. Each of 
the above-mentioned questions have scales that were recoded to run from ‘0’ (Much better) to ‘4’ 
(Much worse). No categories (besides the aforementioned ‘missings’) were removed for the 
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‘Economic Outlook’ question set, however, the variables were recoded so that higher values 
corresponded with perceptions of poorer living and economic conditions. 
 
The ‘Gone Without’ variables were operationalised by questions related to deptivation of basic 
goods and services. One question asked, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your 
family gone without: food, water, medical care, electricity, cooking fuel and a cash income” 
(Afrobarometer, 2003). The scale of the ‘Gone Without’ category ran from ‘0’ (Never), to ‘4’ 
(Always). Together, these items create a lived poverty index, as they reflect the actual deprivation 
experienced by an individual in the Delta region in Nigeria.  
 
‘Perceived Service Availability’ measures how an individual perceives and experiences their 
access to basic services. This item was operationalised with a question that asksed, “Based on your 
experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services?  Or do you never try and get 
these services from government?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The services included were: ‘primary 
school placement’, ‘household services’, ‘government loan or payment’ and ‘help from the police’. 
The variables were recoded to reflect the values where ‘0’ represented (Very easy) to ‘4’ (Never 
tried).  A number of reasons may explain why a respondent never did not attemp to obtain a certain 
service. However, my assumption is that one is deterred when one experiences difficulty in 
obtaining the one of the listed services, rather than it being a result of apathy or ineptitude. Hence, 
‘Never tried’ was placed at the end of the scale that corresponds with an assumed high degree of 
economic marginalisation. 
 
2.4.4 Personal Wealth Index (PWI) 
 
The Perceived Wealth Index (PWI) measures a person’s self assessment of their economic 
position. This item was operationalised by three questions that asked respondents, “On a scale of 
0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which number would you give 
yourself today?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). I recoded the variables in this index so ‘0’ corresponds 
with ‘extreme wealth’ and ‘10’ with ‘extreme poverty’. Two other questions using the same scale 
and vernacular were also included where the respondent rated the wealth of his or her parents and 
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the predicted wealth of the their children. This added an intergenerational dimension to the 
perceived wealth index.  
 
2.4.5 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) 
 
The Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) was operationalised by a set of questions that 
determined whether a certain service was available in the sampling unit. The size of sampling units 
differ based on Afrobarometer’s methodological considerations; however, approximately eight 
interviews were conducted within each sample unit. The sampling unit areas are often 
disaggregated by government localities but the Afrobarometer data set does not provide 
information on exactly what constitutes the sampling unit area. The services included for 
measurement were a post-office, school, police station, bus or taxi service, electricity grid that the 
majority of households have access to, piped water that the majority of households have access to, 
a sewage system the majority of houses have access to, health clinic, recreational facilities, 
community buildings-i.e. town halls, petrol station, liquor store, supermarket, 
cafes/eateryies/corner shops or markets. The variable is a dummy variable as the interviewer 
simply indicated if the aforementioned ‘services’ were present (1) or not (0).  
 
2.4.6 Identity Group Marginalisation 
 
To measure the level of one’s perceived identity group marginalisation, a composite variable was 
created from two items. Initially, this was intended to assess a person’s perception of the extent of 
their identity group’s political and economic marginalisation. The first question used to measure 
this asked the respondent whether, “economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other 
groups in this country” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Afrobarometer does not define the term “other 
groups”; however, regardless of how the term is interpreted by the interviewee, it remains 
indicative of perceived marginalisation the  identity group. This variable is labelled ‘Perceived 
Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’. After recoding the options were ‘0’ (Much better) to 
‘4’ (Much Worse). The second variable – ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’ was 
operationalised using a questions that asked how often the person thinks that his or her identity 
group is “treated unfairly by the government” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Responses were coded in a 
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scale from ‘0’ (Never) to ‘3’ (Always). These two items were then combines and the variables 
recoded to create the IGMI, which runs from ‘0’ to ‘4’, with 4 indicating a higher degree of identity 
group marginalisation. As discussed in the computation section, each variable was treated 
separately in the final regression models, despite the conceptual rationale for measuring the 
aggregated effects of both these elements of identity group marginalisation.  
2.5 Control Variable Operationalisation 
 
 2.5.1 Security Force Trust Index (SFTI)  
To control for other factors, a Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) was created. The SFTI variable 
was comprised of questions that ask, “How much do you trust each of the following institutions - 
the military and police - or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). 
These variables, termed ‘Military Trust’ and ‘Police Trust’ were combined to form the SFTI, 
where responses were coded to range from ‘0’ to ‘3’ with ‘3’ indicating lower levels of trust in 
security forces in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.5.2 Government Trust Index (GTI) 
 
The Government Trust Index (GTI) is operationalised using a questions that asked respondeds to 
rate their level of trust in a number of government institutions. The question asked, “How much 
do you trust each of the following institutions?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The institutions included 
in the question are: The Executive, National Assembly, National Electoral Commission, state 
assembly, respondent's state governor, local government council and the ruling party. Each 
variable was coded individually before creating an index. The individual variables were combined 
to form an index running from ‘0’ to ‘3’, with higher values indicating lower trust levels.  
 
2.5.3 Government Performance Index (GPI) 
 
The Government Performance Index (GPI) is comprised of thirteen items that measure how a 
person rates government performance. The question used to operationalise this was, “How well or 
badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters?” (Afrobarometer, 
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2003). The matters included are: managing the economy, creating jobs, price stability, narrowing 
the wealth gap, crime reduction, basic health service improvement, educational needs, food 
stability, fighting corruption, resolving communal conflict, combating malaria and combating 
AIDS. A GPI composite variable was created, which run on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘3’. Higher values 
correspond with perceptions of poor government performance as this study assumes unfavourable 
attitudes concerning the government’s performance are likely to correlate with higher levels of 
perceived political and economic marginalisation. 
 
2.5.4 Age 
 
‘Age’ was left as a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 82. I am not primarily concerned with 
what specific age groups have more favourable attitudes towards political violence. Hence, this 
study simply aims to control for the effect of on one’s willingness to endorse or engage in political 
violence in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.5.5 Head of Household 
 
‘Head of Household’ is a dummy variable. It was measured using a question that asked, “Are you 
the head of the household?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The variable is coded as ‘0’ (Not head of 
household) and ‘1’ (head of household). 
 
2.5.6 Gender 
 
The study also sought to control for the effect of different genders in condoning or participating in 
political violence. ‘Gender’ was operationalised using a question which asked the interviewer to 
report on the person’s gender. Only two options are provided by Afrobarometer, where ‘1’ 
signifies (Male) and ‘2’ signifies (Female). 
 
2.5.7 Identity Group Prioritisation 
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The ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ variable was formed based on a question  that asked, “If you 
had to choose between being a Nigerian and being a [respondent’s identity group]. Which of these 
two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" (Afrobarometer, 2003).  One was provided 
with two choices, where ‘0’ indicated that a person prioritised their Group Identity and ‘1’ 
indicated their prioritisation of their Nigerian, or national identity. 
2.6 Computation 
 
This section provides the results of the factor and reliability analyses performed on the chosen 
variables. Moreover, it elaborates on the methods used to compute all index variables. At the end 
of the computation section for each composite variable, a minimum number of values required for 
the case inclusion is listed. Unless stated otherwise, this number denotes the minimum number of 
non-missing values required for a case to be included in the computation of the composite variable.  
 
The mean score for a response with ‘missing’ values for certain items is calculated using the 
numerical values of the ‘non-missing’ variables. This method increased the number of available 
cases included in the multiple regression model to increase robustness. Not all variables were 
included in the computation, such as Political Violence Participation. Listwise exclusion was used 
in all factor and reliability analyses, in addition to the computation process for all variables. 
Furthermore, the suitability of the items for the appropriate factor analyses are only listed for 
‘Political Marginalisation’, and unless stated otherwise, the items listed were deemed suitable. The 
pattern matrices and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS) and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) can be 
found in the appropriate tables. 
 
2.6.1 Political Marginalisation  
 
The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS) yielded a significant result (p<.0001). Additionally, the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test provided a value of .868, denoting the selected variables in the 
sample are suitable for factor analysis. Analysis of these 22 items produced five factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one using the Maximum Likelihood extraction method with a Direct 
Oblimin rotation; these five factors explained 44.5 percent of the common variance. See Appendix 
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1. As expected, the questions that measured ‘institutional trust’ all loaded onto a single factor and 
were the only variables with loadings above .30 to load onto that factor. Thus, due to the separate 
factor loadings combined with the previously mentioned rationale, the variables comprising the 
GTI were examined by the regression models as a control composite variable instead of being 
utilised in the PMI. 
 
‘Interest in Public Affairs’ and the ‘Perceived Ability to Make Public Officials Listen’ both loaded 
onto the same factor (factor 4). However, ‘Interest in Public Affairs’ has a loading of .291. 
Although this loading is technically substantive enough for PMI inclusion, the items were better 
slated as a control variable. This is because it is unclear whether interest in public affairs is 
contingent on any feeling of marginalisation or something wholly different.  
 
The items that constituted ‘Perceived Contact with Government Officials’ loaded onto a single 
factor (factor 1) and were the only variables with loadings higher than .30 on factor 1. As expected, 
the questions that measured frequency of contact with non-government officials loaded onto a 
separate factor and will thus be excluded from the PMI. The factor analysis confirmed my 
assumption that they do not correspond with the level of one’s engagement with a state entity. 
 
Finally, the results of the factor analysis yielded that ‘Perceived Legal Inequality’, ‘Perceived 
Attentiveness of Leaders’ and ‘Perceived Difficulty of Voter Registration’ did not load onto any 
of the factors. Hence, these variable were excluded from the PMI. 
 
After excluding the above mentioned items – Interest in Public Affairs, GTI items, Perceived 
Attentiveness of Leaders, Perceived Legal Inequality and Perceived Difficulty of Voter 
Registration   –  seven variables were spread over two factors and used to create a scale. The scale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha (α) of .680. However, when I removed the variable, ‘Perceived Ability to 
Make Public Officials Listen’, the PMI scale’s increased to a superior reliability (α =.836). Thus 
the scale only consists of the ‘Perceived Contact with Government Officials’ question set. 
Although I originally intended to have the PMI scale measure a large swathe of the identified 
political marginalisation elements, the factor and reliability analyses have constrained the PMI to 
only include the questions concerning contact with public officials.  
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However, the scale had to be narrowed down to fewer variables in order to preserve 
methodological integrity. The effects of one’s perceived ability to make public officials listen in 
addition to the level of one’s interest in public affairs are still measured, due to their inclusion as 
separate independent variables in the regression models. However, the term PMI will no longer be 
used as the PMI is solely comprised of the ‘Perceived Contact with Government Officials’ item 
set. Therefore the new variable is ‘Perceived Government Contact’, which is comprised of six 
variables. Each of the variables are set as a scale running from ‘0’ (Never) to ‘3’ (Often). 
Significantly, ‘Perceived Government Contact’ has been recoded so that higher values reflect 
higher levels of perceived contact with government officials. While this study still assumes 
reduced contact is a symptom of marginalisation, this variable labelling allows for a clearer 
discussion in the chapter that follows. Accordingly, the ‘Perceived Government Contact’ 
composite variable also runs on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘3’. The sample consists of 654 respondents 
after listwise case exclusion was used in the computation.  
 
Table 1: Perceived Government Contact Variables 
V1: Contact local government 
councillor 
V4: Contact National Assembly 
representative 
V2: Contact State Assembly 
representative 
V5: Contact official of a government 
ministry 
V3: Contact official in the state 
governor’s office 
 
V6: Contact political party official 
 
 
2.6.2 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) 
 
A factor analysis using the Unweighted Least Square method, provided a rotated solution five 
factors that explain roughly 48.74 percent of the communal variance. See Appendix 2. All 19 
items form reliable scale (α =.747), While these items measure smaller components of personal 
economic marginalisation, as demonstrated by the different factors loadings, they will still be 
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included in the PEMI scale as PEMI aims to capture the overall concept of personal economic 
marginalisation. Furthermore, there were no variables that failed to load onto any of extracted 
factors with eigenvalues greater than one. Therefore, 19 items comprise the PEMI. During the 
computation of the variable, cases were included as long as each case had a non-missing value for 
at least 12 of the 19 PEMI items. 
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Table 2: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Variables 
V1: Country’s present economic conditions 
 
V10: How often gone without medical care 
V2: Your present living conditions 
 
V11: How often gone without cooking fuel 
 
V3: Your living conditions vs. others 
V12: How often gone without electricity 
V13: How often gone without cash income 
V4: Country’s economic conditions 12 
months ago 
 
V14: Difficulty to obtain identity document 
V5: Your living conditions 12 months ago 
 
V15: Difficulty to obtain primary school 
placement 
V6: Country’s economic conditions in 12 
months 
 
V16: Difficulty to obtain voter registration 
card 
 
V7: Your living conditions in 12 months 
 
V17: Difficulty to obtain household services 
 
V8: How often gone without food 
 
V18: Difficulty to obtain government loan or 
payment 
 
V9: How often gone without water 
 
V19: Difficulty to obtain help from the police 
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2.6.3 Personal Wealth Index (PWI) 
 
Because the scale is encompassed by just three variables, factor analysis is not appropriate. The 
PWI scale has a low reliability (α =.661); however, dataset contained no other variables that fit 
into the PWI form a conceptual point of view. Therefore, the low reliability of the PWI is a 
limitation of this study. When the PWI was computed, each case required a ‘non-missing’ value 
for at least one out of three items for PWI inclusion. Thus the final case number in the variable is 
6.
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2.6.4 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) 
 
This factor analysis used the Unweighted Least Square method. It provided a rotated solution with 
five factors with eigenvalues greater than one that explains 56.73 percent of the communal 
variance. See Appendix 3.  Despite the different loadings, a scale with all sixteen items was 
included and was highly reliable (α =.849). The minimum number of ‘non-missing’ values 
necessary for a case to be included was ten, leading to an AEMI consisting of 668 cases. 
 
Table 3: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) Variables 
V1:Post-office in the PSU/EA V9: Health clinic in the PSU/EA 
V2:School in the PSU/EA V10:Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA 
V3:Police station in the PSU/EA V11:Community buildings in the PSU/EA 
V4:Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA V12:Petrol station in the PSU/EA 
V5:Electricity grid in the PSU/EA V13:Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the 
PSU/EA 
V6:Piped water system in the PSU/EA V14:Supermarket in the PSU/EA 
V7:Sewage system in the PSU/EA V15:Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the 
PSU/EA 
V8:Railway station in the PSU/EA V16:Market Stalls in the PSU/EA 
2.6.5 Identity Group Marginalisation  
 
Although ‘Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’ and ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’ 
were slated to comprise the IGMI. A reliability analyses of the two items returned a negative 
Cronbach’s alpha. As such both ‘Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’ and ‘Perceived 
Identity Group Treatment’ were treated as separate independent variables. 
 
2.6.6 Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) 
 
As the index is only comprised of two items, Military Trust and Police Trust it exhibits a low 
reliability (α =.557). Although not an ideal Cronbach’s alpha, it is sufficient to proceed as the scale 
is reliable more often than not and this study aims to measure the effects of trust in the state security 
apparatus as a single concept.  After listwise exclusion was utilised in the SFTI’s computation, the 
SFTI consists of 644 cases. 
 
2.6.7 Government Trust Index (GTI) 
 
A factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood extraction method and all items 
in the index loaded onto one factor that explained 59.41 percent of communal variance. See 
Appendix 4.  The Government Trust Index (GTI) scale is highly reliable (α =.884).  The minimum 
number of non-missing values necessary for a case to be included was three, with the GTI 
consisting of 655 cases. 
 
2.6.8 Government Performance Index (GPI) 
 
The Maximum Likelihood extraction method extracted two factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one and this explained 46.98 percent of the shared variance. All of the variables loaded onto one 
factor, except for the items pertaining to communal conflict, malaria and counter HIV/AIDS efforts 
See Appendix 5. The frequency distribution tables revealed that a greater number of respondents 
held more favourable views regarding the government’s performance concerning the three 
aforementioned issues and this explains the different loadings. Despite the different factor 
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loadings, these are still aspects of government performance and therefore, they were included in 
the GPI index. Furthermore, all thirteen items comprise a reliable scale (α=.876).  The minimum 
number of ‘non-missing’ values necessary for a case to be included was eight, with the GPI 
consisting of 663 valid cases.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides clarification on the operationalisation the conceptualisation of political, 
economic and identity group marginalisation. The items were based on the literature’s core 
arguments explaining political violence in the Niger Delta. this section also illuminated the 
computation of control variables used in general and Delta-specific theories of political violence. 
Although I initially intended to use the PMI as a measurement of perceived political exclusion; 
such an index would not have been valid due to methodological issues. Thus whilst the only 
composite variable that measures perceived political exclusion is ‘Perceived Government 
Contact’; ‘Interest in Public Affairs’, ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ 
and the ‘Political Affiliation’ variables all attempt to measure some element of Political 
Marginalisation.  
 
Furthermore, each variable’s inclusion was based on literature, had a conceptual basis (Head of 
Household) and underwent methodological confirmation via factor and reliability analyses. As 
such, the final sixteen variables are seen as the most accurate indicators to measure the core 
concepts and control variables, derived from the Afrobarometer questionnaire. Even prior to 
statistical analysis, it is clear that they allude to the complexities of the broader marginalisation 
concepts that mainstream political violence literature, both general and Niger Delta specific, has 
tended to overlook. 
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Chapter 3: Results and Conclusion  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation has assessed the arguments advanced by academic literature on political, 
economic and/or ethnic marginalisation’s effect on political violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta 
region. The literature suggests that large portions of the population suffer from a lack of 
meaningful political representation and feel the harsh effects of poor economic growth. This is 
despite large amounts of natural resource wealth extraction from the Delta states. The sources also 
reveal that a major ethnic group of the Delta (the Ijaw) have had little federal government 
representation, which has allowed for the persistence of political violence by non-state actors 
(Mähler, 2010; Omotola, 2009; Tobor, 2016). However, this study’s main hypothesis focused on 
perceived political marginalisation’s effect on one’s willingness to justify and engage in political 
violence, as political power is seen as an avenue towards economic prosperity in Nigeria (Bekoe, 
2005; Courson, 2011; Obi, 2009; Omeje, 2004).  
 
The violence evident in the region takes multiple forms. There are organised armed groups such 
as MEND, which attack oil installations and there are various other manifestations of violent civil 
unrest (Idemudia & Ite 2007). Amongst the literature on Niger Delta violence, there is very little 
that use survey data on attitudes of perceptions of marginalisations. I have argued that 
marginalisation has been ill-defined in the literature, as psychological concepts (such as how 
someone feels or perceives marginalisation) are measured by observed data points. An example is 
the Human Development Index, which does not measure how people feel about the level of 
development, or level of perceived marginalisation. My results challenge the purported ingrained 
explanations of political violence in the Niger Delta, while also affirming that certain aspects of 
political marginalisation do catalyse favourable attitudes towards political violence. 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of my results, and problematises the concept of 
‘marginalisation’. I argue that the concept may not be appropriate for use in providing casual 
explanations of political violence. the chapter shall also showcase why further research on the 
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relationships between the presumed aspects of political marginalisation require further empirical 
research. 
3.2 Univariate Analysis 
Just under one third (30.5%) of Delta residents stated they have used, or would be willing to “use 
force or violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Furthermore, 33.4 percent of Niger 
Delta inhabitants stated they either agreed with, or very strongly agreed that violence is sometimes 
necessary to achieve political goals, although this number is lower as fewer people answered this 
question. As noted in Chapter 1, I define political violence as physical damage to property and/or 
individuals (Mähler, 2010) that seeks to change the political system, or one’s position within that 
system.  
 
When respondents were asked if they would “use force or violence for a political cause” 
(Afrobarometer, 2003) the modal, or most frequent response given (out of a sample size [N] of 655 
respondents) was ‘No’.  The available choices were ‘No’ and ‘Yes’, and the standard deviation 
(SD) was .461 with a standard error (SE) of .018.  For the second dependent variable, which is 
scored from ‘1’ to ‘4’ and gives the respondents (N=617) the options to agree/ or strongly agree/ 
with the statements: Statement A: “The use of violence is never justified in Nigerian politics” and 
Statement B “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause” 
(Afrobarometer, 2003) the modal response was to agree with Statement A (SD= .950; SE=.038). 
 
The univariate data for the variable ‘Perceived Government Contact’ (scored from 0 to 3; SD= 
.481; SE=.019) indicate the sample perceived themselves principally as being politically 
marginalised, with ‘0’ (never having contacted a government representative) being the modal 
response. A high degree of perceived marginalisation is evident in the sample, based on the 
assumption that marginalisation corresponds with decreased contact with a government official,  
and the mean of ‘Perceived Government Contact’ was .256. However, as discussed in the later 
portion of this chapter, the assumption that a lack of contact with a government official indicated 
maginalisation may be incorrect. 
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Table 4: Univariate Statistics 
Variable 
N Mean Standard 
Error  
Mode Standard 
deviation 
Political 
Violence 
Justification 
617 2.160 .038 2 .950 
Political 
Violence 
Participation 
655 0.305 .018 0.00 (No 
category) 
.461 
Interest in 
Public Affairs 
652 1.18 .027 1 .697 
Perceived 
Ability to Make 
Elected 
Representatives 
Listen 
625 2.62 .044 1 1.112 
Political 
Affiliation: 
595 .432 .020 0 (feel close 
to a party) 
.496 
Perceived 
Government 
Contact 
655 .256 .019 0 .484 
PEMI 666 2.059 .019 2 .493 
PWI 667 3.635 .063 3.33 1.635 
AEMI 
668 .577 .010 .38 (smallest 
mode) 
.248 
Perceived 
Identity Group 
Treatment 
579 1.860 .041 3 .990 
Perceived 
Group 
Economic 
Marginalisation 
590 1.373 .043 2 1.050 
SFTI 644 2.581 .023 3 .577 
GTI 655 2.617 .018 3 .460 
GPI 663 2.216 .020 3 .512 
Age 667 31.36 .479 20 12.358 
Head of House 
Hold 
668 .645 .019 1 .479 
Gender 668 1.50 .019 2 .500 
Identity 
Prioritisation 
600 .375 .020 0 .485 
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The above table suggests that Niger Delta residents perceive themselves to be less economically 
marginalised, compared to their views concerning their degree of political alienation. This was 
evident when PEMI (N=666) univariate statistics are analysed. The PEMI, that runs from ‘0’ to 
‘4’, exhibited a mode of 2 and a mean of 2.06 (SD= .493; SE=.019). However, when compared to 
those revealed by the PWI, the PEMI marginalisation attitudes exhibit a higher degree of 
marginalisation. The mean and mode of the PWI (N=6687) are 3.63 and 3.33 (SD=1.635; SE=.063) 
on a scale that runs from ‘0’ to ‘10’, respectively. In contrast to the PWI, the AEMI (N=668) 
manifests a lesser degree of economic marginalisation. The mean and the smallest modal responses 
are .577 and .38 (SD=.248; SE=.001) which run on a scale from ‘0’ (service absent) to ‘1’ (service 
present), thus indicating a that a respondent perceives the area in which they live to be more 
developed than undeveloped. 
 
Therefore, the data provides some significant insights into attitudes of political and economic 
marginalisation and propensity to endorse and engage in political violence. From the sample, it 
may be inferred that the Delta population does not have strong overall inclinations towards 
political violence but does feel politically marginalised. It appears that residents also have negative 
perceptions pertaining to personal wealth, but do not exhibit a strong degree of other forms of 
economic marginalisation or identity group marginalisation, despite much of the literature 
concerning the Niger Delta. 
3.3 Political Violence Justification Regression Results 
 
A multivariate linear regression model was conducted to explain justification of political violence 
using sixteen predictor variables. The main explanatory variables are: ‘Interest in Public Affairs’, 
‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’, ‘Perceived Government Contact’ and 
‘Political Affiliation’. The Control variables are: PEMI, PWI, AEMI, Perceived Identity Group 
Treatment, Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation, SFTI, GTI, GPI, Age, Head of House 
Hold, and Gender Identity Prioritisation. The model was suitable for the data (f=1.689) and was 
statistically significant (p=.046). It also accounted for 2.5 percent (Adjusted R²=.025) of the 
variance in the dependent variable. ‘Interest in Public Affairs’ and ‘Perceived Ability to Make 
Elected Representatives Listen’ were the only statistically significant variables in the model (at a 
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P Value significance level of .05) that predicted ‘Political Violence Justification’ scores. ‘Interest 
in Public Affairs’ exhibited a negative relationship (β=-.151; p=.003) with ‘Political Violence 
Justification’, while ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ yielded a positive 
relationship (β= .098; p=.048) with the dependent variable.  
 
 
Table 5: Political Violence Justification Regression Model 
I.V. Standard 
Error 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Beta  
Coefficient 
t statistic p value 
Constant .538 2.776  5.159 .000 
Interest in Public 
Affairs 
.067 -.202 -.151 -3.032 
.003** 
Perceived 
Ability to Make 
Elected 
Representatives 
Listen 
.044 -.088 -.098 1.987 .048** 
Perceived 
Government 
Contact 
.102 .121 .061 1.183 .237 
Political 
Affiliation:  
.096 .047 .025 .493 .622 
PEMI .112 .104 .054 .931 .353 
PWI .032 .007 .013 .235 .814 
AEMI .190 -.067 -.017 -.351 .726 
Perceived 
Identity Group 
Treatment 
.052 .039 .041 .757 .450 
Perceived Group 
Economic 
Marginalisation 
.051 -.024 -.027 -.477 .634 
SFTI .102 .008 .005 .082 .935 
GTI .128 -.167 -.083 -1.308 .192 
GPI .104 -.012 -006 -.115 .908 
Age .004 -.001 -.014 -.243 .808 
Head of House 
Hold 
.114 -.005 -.002 -.041 .967 
Gender .097 .061 .032 .626 .532 
Identity 
Prioritisation 
.094 -.102 -.054 -1.084 .279 
Adjusted R2  =.025      P<0.05** 
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3.3.1 Endorsement or Justification of Political Violence: Discussion 
 
As the numerical value for ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ increased 
the respondent was less likely to believe that political violence was ever justifiable. The increased 
scores are indicative of the beliefs that one has little influence on elected representatives and these 
respondents were more likely to have favourable views towards the justification of political 
violence. This falls in line with my prediction that there is something intrinsic to feelings of 
political marginalisation that will affect attitudes concerning the justification of political violence. 
The reasoning follows that citizens who believe their governments fail to listen to and represent 
their interests are more likely to justify alternative means to attain their ends beyond the established 
legal channels (Hirlinger, 1992). Thus, the statistical significance of ‘Perceived Ability to Make 
Elected Representatives Listen’ and positive standardized beta coefficient confirm the positive 
correlation between feelings of political marginalisation and more favourable attitudes towards the 
justification of political violence. The ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ 
represents a portion of political exclusion (Bratton, 2012; Hirlinger, 1992). The results substantiate 
general and Delta-specific theories that argue that political alienation can lead to conditions 
conducive to political violence justification. 
 
The model’s other statistically significant variable, ‘Interest in Public Affairs’, did not exhibit the 
predicted direction. As a respondent’s interest in politics increased the interviewee was less likely 
to believe that political violence was ever justifiable. This is in contrast to my prediction that a 
higher degree of interest in politics is necessary for one’s justification of political violence. 
Although this is not proven by the statistical analysis, the fact that a high degree of political interest 
does not correlate with a favourable disposition towards political violence justification, may 
indicate perceptions of political marginalisation may actually decrease interest in public affairs.  
This on the grounds that people lose interest in politics if they cannot affect political outcomes. 
This is based on the reasoning supported by the literature that argues politically marginalised 
individuals are more likely to engage in political violence (Gurr, 2006; Omotola, 2009). However, 
the results cannot conclusively determine if political marginalisation influences interest in public 
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affairs. However, the relationship between political interest and marginalisation remains unclear. 
Hence, more research should be conducted into the factors that influence interest in politics, given 
that this variable may assist in predicting the likelihood of the degree of political violence 
justification.  
 
The variables that were not statistically significant will be discussed in the next section. The 
relationship between the condoning of violence and actual participation in violent acts requires 
further research. The justification of political violence may explain the region’s persistent political 
violence, even if though a justification of violence does not necessarily lead to individual 
participation.  
 
Nonetheless, favourable attitudes towards political violence justification exhibited by the region’s 
citizenry may explain Delta inhabitants’ amenability towards violent groups, as argued by Olojede, 
(2000) and Orogun (2010). This carries the potential to result in the implicit or tacit support of 
armed groups such as MEND. Additionally, it may result in a failure to condemn violent 
gatherings, even if one would does not engage in political violence him or herself. Thus, a civilian 
population that exhibits a high degree of justification for political violence is likely to complicate 
counterinsurgency strategies, due to the potential of aiding and abetting militant groups (Arjona, 
2015). Another potential situation is if the state perceives there to be population support for militia, 
which could lead to counterinsurgency operations that cause mass civilian casualties. This was 
seen in the example provided earlier by Odi Invasion, where the Nigerian military destroyed an 
entire village in such an anti-militant operation (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013).  
 
The data also suggests that the link between attitudes that justify political violence and the extent 
of support with anti-government movements requires further study. Surprisingly, the factors 
expected to influence political violence such as economic marginalisation, identity group 
marginalisation and trust in security forces do not appear to contribute to attitudes concerning 
political violence justification in the Niger Delta.  Although there were statistically low levels of 
feelings of political marginalisation, there remained as increase in the respondent pool’s 
justification of political violence. This means that scholars should review the accepted causes of 
political violence justification in the Delta to ascertain whether they are applicable to other case 
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studies or general theories. Furthermore, the statistical significance of both ‘Interest in Public 
Affairs’ and ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ signifies that there is a 
need for a disaggregation of the components of perceived political marginalisation to provide 
clearer understanding on the specific items, or societal-government relationships, that affect the 
propensity for the justification of political violence. 
3.4 Political Violence Participation: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Prior to testing the model, the reference category for the dependent variable was set to the category 
indicating persons who were not willing to “use force or violence for a political cause” 
(Afrobarometer, 2003). The main explanatory variables analysed by the model are: ‘Interest in 
Public Affairs’, ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’, ‘Perceived 
Government Contact’ and ‘Political Affiliation’. The Control variables are: PEMI, PWI, AEMI, 
‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’, ‘Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation’, SFTI, GTI, 
GPI, ‘Age’, ‘Head of House Hold’, and ‘Gender Identity Prioritisation’. The Political Violence 
Participation logistic regression model was statistically significant (Chi-Square=64.177; df=16; 
p<.001) and explains roughly 18.5 percent (Nagelkerke’s pseudo R²=.185) of Political Violence 
Participation’s variance.  Four variables ‘Perceived Government Contact’ (p <.001), ‘Political 
Affiliation’ (p=.024), ‘Age’ (p=.008) and ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ (p=.011) were significant 
at the P Value significance level of .05. The data reflects that as ‘Perceived Government Contact’ 
increases, people three times more likely (OR=3.045) to be willing to participate in political 
violence, relative to those who expressed no desire for political violence participation. Older 
people were 2.9 percent less willing (OR=.971) to participate in political violence. Furthermore, 
those who felt close to a political party (Political Affiliation) (OR=.595) were 40.5 percent less 
inclined to participate in political violence. Another significant result is that those who prioritised 
their group identity were 1.8  (OR=1.833) times more likely to participate in political violence 
than those who prioritised national identity as their identity marker. 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
Table 6 Political Violence Participation Regression Model 
479 cases processed in Regression model 
Reference: Not Willing to Use Force or Violence for Political Cause 
 
 
I.V. 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
P value. 
Exp(B)/ 
Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Interest in Public Affairs 1 .121 1.293 .934 1.789 
Perceived Ability to Make Elected 
Representatives Listen 
1 .152 .857 .694 1.059 
Perceived Government Contact 1 p<.001** 3.045 1.851 5.009 
Political Affiliation: Not close to 
party 
1 .024** .595 .378 .935 
Reference: Political Affiliation 
:close to party 
     
PWI 1 .101 1.132 .976 1.313 
AEMI 1 .806 1.121 .451 2.783 
Perceived Identity Group Treatment 1 .101 1.230 .961 1.576 
Perceived Group Economic 
Marginalisation 
1 .433 1.102 0.864 1.405 
SFTI 1 .795 1.067 .654 1.740 
GTI 1 .277 1.410 .759 2.620 
GPI 1 .579 .865 .518 1.445 
Age 1 .010** .971 .949 .993 
Not Head of House Hold 1 .067 1.650 .965 2.822 
Reference: Head of House Hold      
Male  .983 1.005 .635 1.591 
Reference: Female      
Identity Group Prioritisation  .012** 1.833 1.144 2.936 
Reference: Nigerian Identity 
Prioritisation 
     
P<0.05** 
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3.4.1 Participation in Political Violence: Discussion  
 
As expected, ‘Age’, ‘Political Affiliation’ and ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ all affected the 
propensity of Niger Delta residents to participate in political violence. While the casual effect of 
age on political violence participation is still debated (Obi, 2009); as predicted by the literature, an 
increase in age correlated with decreased willingness to participate in political violence. The lack 
of feelings of closeness to a political party (Political Affiliation) was also identified as a core 
element of political marginalisation, as it is indicative of a perceived lack of a political voice 
(Erdman, 2007; Lipset 1959). The data result substantiates that the level of closeness one feels to 
a political party affects one’s willingness to participate in political violence; which affirms general 
theories on this topic, such as that by Lipset (1959), when applied to the Delta. Having said this, a 
lack of political party affiliation is only one aspect of political exclusion. Thus, we are reminded 
that theories using the term ‘political marginalisation’ should interrogate the use of the term and 
ask which specific aspects of the exclusion concept may be the dominant have explanatory factor. 
This applies to theories on political violence in general, and in the nine Delta states. 
 
Likewise, as expected, the prioritisation of one’s group identity over Nigerian or national identity 
prioritisation increased the likelihood of one’s willingness to participate in political violence. The 
finding follows the rationale lower levels of national identity prioritisation entails less of a moral 
allegiance to the government, which may deter individuals from engaging in violence against the 
Nigerian state (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Watts, 2004). However, ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ is 
not a measure of a group’s perceived marginalisation and relates to theories concerning the social 
contract and national vs group/lingual/ethnic identity in the Niger Delta, opposed to specific 
grievances suffered by people that do not prioritise a nation state identity. While the study does 
not specifically measure ethnic marginalisation or ties to ethnicity, roughly two thirds of 
respondents stated their ethnicity was the primary feature they used as their identity marker. Thus 
theories concerning ethnic marginalisation and political violence should be re-evaluated to include 
conceptions of the self and identity as it may be a key indicator for one’s propensity to engage in 
political violence. This may apply to non-case specific arguments as well. 
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However, some findings ran contrary to my hypothesis. As the frequency of Perceived 
Government Contact increased (what I originally assumed represented a lower degree of political 
marginalisation) the likelihood of the respondent being willing to engage in political violence, 
increased. This is in relation to respondents who had no desire for political violence participation. 
I advance several possible explanations for this result. 
 
Firstly, one may become frustrated after contacting a public official as the individual may be 
ignored. The repeated, fruitless contact leads to discontent in the political system thereby creating 
the inclination to participate in political violence due to negative views held by the Niger Delta 
inhabitants concerning their political institutions and figures (Eberlein, 2006). In this case, 
regardless of the initial reason for contact, the interaction with a political representative is what 
creates the perception of political marginalisation, as the individual feels side-lined by the official. 
As the modal response for all questions that comprised the ‘Perceived Government Contact’ Index 
was “Never,” the absolute lack of contact would thus lead to no frustration and thus no desire for 
participation in political violence, as a channel of political expression has been removed or blocked 
(White, 2000). 
 
Scenario two challenges my initial assumption that politically marginalised Niger Delta inhabitants 
do not contact public officials. Following Hirlinger (1992) this study assumed that politically 
marginalised individuals would be unlikely to contact government officials because they believe 
that their demands will not be heard (Hirlinger, 1992). However, if the opposite is true, increased 
feelings of marginalisation would lead to more contact. Therefore, if this scenario holds true the 
assumption that marginalisation leads to little contact – which was my initial assumption of 
political marginalisation was based on – is incorrect. Rather, increased contact is seen as a 
symptom of increased perceptions of marginalisation. However, this theory is undermined if the 
model response of never contacting an official is the result of material barriers, such as time, travel 
distance, the financial expense and the representative’s availability. It must be noted that it is 
possible contact is not related to marginalisation and thus a separate factor in explaining attitudes 
towards political violence. Unfortunately, the nuances of this relationship are beyond the scope of 
this study. Therefore, the Perceived Government Contact’s association with Political Violence 
Participation begs the question of to what extent political marginalisation affects Niger Delta 
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inhabitants’ willingness to contact public officials and whether this is an appropriate measure of 
political marginalisation. This highlights the importance of studies that measure the factors that 
drive people to contact public officials in Nigeria, and the Niger Delta region specifically (Ajayi 
& Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & Ite, 2005).  
3.5 General Discussion 
‘Perceived Government Contact’ was found to be statistically significant in the Political Violence 
Participation model, whilst not being statistically significant in the ‘Political Violence 
Justification’ model. This raises further questions concerning the interaction of the motives that 
drive individuals to participate in political violence. Presumably, why did Perceived Government 
Contact not have a significant impact on the variance of Political Violence Justification? This 
question is posed as it is assumed that one would condone violence prior to deciding to participate 
in political violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). As it stands, the relationship between 
political violence justification and participation remains unclear in terms of why it is the case that 
increased contact with public officials increases the likelihood of participating in political violence 
but does affect attitudes concerning the justification of political violence. Accordingly, the 
interaction between justification and participation of political violence merits further investigation. 
 
However, the fact that ‘Interest in Public Affairs’ is statistically significant in the Political Violence 
Justification model, but not in the Political Violence Participation model adheres to the existing 
academic framework concerning the barriers to violent action (Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2010). The 
belief that political violence is justified does not inform a willingness to participate in violence due 
to the perceived costs and/or punishments associated with violent action (Muller & Weede (1990; 
Stewart, 2010). However, Stewart’s concept of horizontal inequality and how group grievances 
can contribute to addressing collective action problems may provide a rationale for the significance 
of ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ in the Political Violence Participation model.  
 
The problem of collective action is that one may not participate for fear that others will not 
participate and so one may rather seek to further his individual needs if they are secured. Stewart 
(2010) argues that when a grievance is internalised as a group grievance, rather than an individual 
one, the collective action problem is solved as a group identity allows for easy organisation and 
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group mobilisation. However, if this were the case, we would expect the two variables that measure 
perceived identity group marginalisation – ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’ and ‘Perceived 
Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’ – to exhibit statistical significance. Thereby, theories 
that argue that political violence arises from, or is not deterred by, a lack of national identity – 
potentially rooted in the underpinnings of the colonial state (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & 
Ite 2005) – are more applicable to the Niger Delta context than the theories that argue identity 
(usually ethnic), political or economic marginalisation fail to have a statistically significant effect 
on political violence attitudes in the Niger Delta. The data suggests that the way in which an 
individual identifies concerning national or group identity, is a more salient determinant their 
propensity to engage in political violence than said group’s perceived marginalisation. Thus, this 
stufy propses that arguments on ethnic marginalisation and their potential effect on political 
violence in the region should be reviewed.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that neither the GTI nor SFTI provide a statistically significant portion of 
either models’ variance seems to be an anomaly due to the salience of ‘Identity Group 
Prioritisation’. Both the GTI and the SFTI indices are measures of trust in government and state-
run institutions, and hence are related to a contractual relationship with the state, similar to 
‘Identity Group Prioritisation’. The fact that there is no statistical significance with the SFTI is 
peculiar, given that the Delta inhabitants tend to have a tenuous and antagonistic relationship with 
the Nigerian government (Idemudia & Ite, 2005; Obi,2009). Hence, the findings contradict general 
theories that argue a trust in state institutions is necessary for a peaceful society (Muller & Weede, 
1990). It also poses a challenge to theories that have argued brutal repression by security forces is 
likely to spur violence, as state repression has been evident in the Delta region (Arjona, 2015; 
Bekoe, 2005; Stearns, 1979). 
 
Interestingly none of the variables that measured economic marginalisation were statistically 
significant in explaining engagement in violence in either model either, which contradicts the 
myriad theories that explain political violence in the Niger Delta via an economic exclusion 
framework. This finding urges that more research be done to explain political marginalisation’s 
effect on engaging in political violence in the Niger Delta. While the Niger Delta inhabitants suffer 
significant degrees of economic marginalisation (Ikelegbe 2005; Obi, 2009), economic disparity 
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is not a statistically significant factor in explaining Delta inhabitants’ attitudes concerning the 
justification of, and the willingness to participate in political violence. Nonetheless, resources will 
continue to play a critical role in the Niger Delta’s violence, as political efficacy may be viewed 
as the path to obtain the region’s resource wealth. 
 
The findings raise further questions related to how Niger Delta inhabitants view the relationship 
between economic prosperity and their political influence. The apparent low effect of economic 
marginalisation on both political violence variables in both models may be a result of Niger Delta 
residents realising that the path to economic prosperity is through political power (Mähler, 2010)  
and that the region’s dire economic situation is viewed as a consequence of politics (Omeje, 2004). 
Another explanation is that the region’s inhabitants blame macroeconomic factors, such as the 
price of oil, for their economic woes. Much of the literature argues that politics are intrinsically 
linked to economics in Nigeria. Hence, the statistical significance of ‘Perceived Ability to Make 
Elected Representatives Listen’ to justify political violence, as well as the significant relationship 
between ‘Political Affiliation’ and participation in violence may be evidence that people living in 
the Delta believe political power is the path to wealth.  
 
However, neither of these variables measure the attempted access to wealth via politics. Rather, 
they measured the relationship with elected and officials and political parties. While this study 
does not attempt to answer this question, it does indicate the importance that Delta inhabitants 
place on the political sphere, as further evidenced by the lack of statistical significance of the 
Government Performance Indicator (GPI) in both models.  
 
The fact that the GPI’s had no statistical significance is a further signal that Niger Delta inhabitants 
are more concerned about access to political power, or having a political voice or representation 
than having an efficient government. Presumably, giving credence to the idea that the respondents 
are separating the political and economic spheres as respondents are more concerned with political 
clout. Furthermore, neither ‘Head of Household’ nor ‘Gender’  were statistically significant 
predictors of attitudes towards political violence in either model, thus rebuking my assumption 
that the familiar responsibility bestowed on a head of house would serve as a political violence 
deterrent. As such, the salience of gender regarding political violence justification and 
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participation should be reassessed, due to assumptions that women are often non-participants in 
political violence (Coulter, Persson, & Utas, 2008). 
 
Finally, the fact that no control variables, besides ‘Age’ and ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ were 
significant urges that there be a re-evaluation of theoretical literature on the causes of political 
violence in the Niger Delta. These control variables, which are often cited by the literature, failed 
to account for the justification of, and the willingness to participate in political violence. Thus 
proponents of the explanatory power of these variables ought to re-evaluate their significance in 
specific contexts, especially when evaluating Niger Delta violence. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation’s initial aim was test to test whether mainstream academic theories that purported 
political, economic and identity marginalisation accurately depicted the causal factors behind 
violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It made use of survey data to measure respondents’ 
opinions towards perceived marginalisation and the respective effects of a) the justification of, and 
b) participation in political violence. The first benefit of survey methodology is that it provided a 
more accurate measurement of ‘marginalisation’ as a perceived state, as marginalisation is 
experienced by people and is thus a subjective experience. Other development indexes like the 
Human Development Index (HDI), have tended to measure more concrete things like electricity 
availability and sanitation standards. However, whilst helpful in many senses, tools like the HDI 
cannot aptly measure human behaviour and attitudes. It may fall short in measuring 
marginalisation, as not every respondent may have the same ‘HDI value’ in a given area. Other 
seemingly objectively verifiable data, such as GDP per capita, does not reflect attitudes of the 
citizenry (Østby, 2013). Even qualitative studies that seek to explain violence in the Niger Delta 
tend to utilise the vague ‘marginalisation terminology’ and assume it exists in some form, be it 
political, economic, social etc. without properly defining the term. Consequently, this study 
showed the complexities of attempting to measure marginalisation, notably political 
marginalisation.  
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However, it should be acknowledged that it is likely that a certain percentage of survey respondents 
did not answer the questions honestly (Bertrand, & Mullainathan, 2001). This is likely due the fear 
of punitive measures be enacted against respondents who displayed favourable attitudes towards 
violence.  
 
 Nevertheless, these results, at least partially, confirm theories that argue political marginalisation 
does lead to political violence. They also raise questions concerning how political marginalisation 
is measured, and how multifaceted and ill-defined the concept is. The effect of ‘Perceived 
Government Contact’ calls into question whether this is a symptom of political marginalisation 
and how different aspects of political exclusion - such as Interest in Public Affairs and Political 
Affiliation - can affect propensity to endorse of engage in political violence. 
 
Furthermore, although the Niger Delta states are underdeveloped, compared to the rest of Nigeria 
(Tobor,2016), this study did not find economic marginalisation measures to be salient predictors 
of the willingness to participate in, and justify political violence. Additionally, those who 
experienced identity group marginalisation did not hold favourable attitudes towards political 
violence. These findings lead one to question the applicability of economic-rooted theories 
explaining violence in the Delta region. 
 
The findings also further highlight the importance of paying attention to particular context when 
analysing the causes of political violence or attitudes towards violence as legitimate political 
expressions. Furthermore, the apparently weak effect of economic marginalisation has 
implications for policy makers. The fact that this, along with ‘Perceived Government Contact’, 
‘Interest in Public Affairs’, ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ and ‘Political Affiliation’ suggest the 
importance of the political relationship between the state and its citizenry. While these variables 
may be critiqued for failing to measure all elements of political marginalisation (although ‘Identity 
Group Prioritisation’ was not intended to) the statistical significance of these variables, with 
regards to the political violence models, highlight that the political dynamic between government 
and constituents remains a pivotal concern when explaining propensity to justify or engage in 
political violence. Although this study has alluded to certain factors that influence violence, further 
questions are raised concerning how citizens view the state and its role in economic prosperity. As 
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the country’s GDP in 2002 was below the Sub-Saharan Africa average GDP per capita (World 
Bank, 2018) it is quensrionable whether the Niger Delta inhabitants blame macroeconomic trends 
or Nigerian policies for economic underperformance. Given the confluence of economic wealth 
and political power (Mähler, 2010; Osaghae, 1995) in addition to the salience of the political 
variables, it appears the delta’s citizenry believes the polity bears greater responsibility.  
 
Nevertheless, these results do provide an avenue to mend grievances that do not require expensive 
development projects or extended patronage systems. Instead, a revitalised social contract is a 
potential solution to potentially alleviate the high levels of violence in the Delta. The violent 
protests and militant attacks have resumed in recent years following the amnesty deal expiration 
and the stoppage of cash payments to Delta communities (Golden-Timsar, 2018). Thus a renewed 
social contract is a possible alternative to continued patronage and bribery along with costly 
security operations from a fiscal and humanitarian standpoint.  
 
As such, Federal and Niger Delta politicians should consider why more contact with public 
officials predicts willingness to participate in violence, as this is a key indicator that the 
relationship between the state and Delta population is dysfunctional. This combined with my 
findings that the political relationship is paramount provides an argument that the social contract 
be re-evaluated and renegotiated. This could be done is in a way that prioritises Nigerian nation 
state identity opposed to a group identity prioritisation, as this could lead to a decreased willingness 
to partake in political violence. I suggest that more research be conducted to explain citizen-state 
relationships and their effects on political violence dispositions. Despite improved resource 
allocation and development, a focus on nurturing and restoring people’s sense of political inclusion 
should have lasting effects on alleviating political violence in the Niger Delta.
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Appendix A 
 
Note all loading coefficients (with the exception of interest in public affairs) lower than .30 were 
removed. 
Appendix 1: Political Marginalisation Factor Loadings 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS): p<.0001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)     :.868 
Item Name Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
 Factor 5 
Interest in public 
affairs 
   -.289  
Perceived ability 
to make elected 
officials listen 
   .333  
Contact local 
government 
councillor 
.515 
 
    
Contact state 
assembly 
representative 
.721     
Contact state 
government 
official 
.781     
Contact National 
Assembly 
representative 
 
.735     
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Contact ministry 
official 
 
.750     
Contact political 
party official 
.535    -.328 
Contact 
traditional leader 
  .713   
Contact village 
official 
  .928   
Other influential 
person 
  .368   
Contact religious 
leader 
     
Trust in 
President 
 .666    
Trust in National 
assembly 
 .737    
Trust in electoral 
commission 
 .660    
Trust in state 
assembly 
 .729    
Trust in state 
governor 
 .818    
Trust in local 
government 
council 
 .818    
Trust in ruling 
party 
 .658    
Perceived Legal 
inequality 
     
Perceived 
Attentiveness of 
Leaders 
     
Difficulty of 
Voter 
Registration 
     
Eigenvalues 5.244 3.524 1.609 1.165 1.101 
Shared 
Variance 
27.760 13.959 4.755 2.179 1.856 
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Appendix 2: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS): p<.0001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)         :.763 
 
 
 
Item Name Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Economic conditions  .593    
Living conditions  .595    
Cross Nigerian 
living conditions 
comparison 
 .595    
Previous Economic 
conditions 
 .581    
Previous living 
conditions 
 .719    
Future economic 
conditions 
   .640  
Future living 
conditions 
   .968  
Gone without food   .527   
Gone without water   .701   
Gone without 
medical care 
  .745   
Gone without 
electricity 
  .331   
Gone without 
cooking fuel 
  .552   
Gone without cash 
income 
  .597   
Difficulty to obtain 
id 
.709     
Difficulty to obtain 
primary school 
placement 
.627     
Difficulty to register 
to vote 
.607     
Difficulty to obtain 
household services 
.380    -.508 
Difficulty to obtain 
loan 
    -.802 
Difficulty to get help 
from police 
    -.525 
Eigenvalues 3.715 3.322 2.334 1.165 1.027 
Percent of Variance 16.964 15.267 9.478 3.700 3.329 
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Appendix 3: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS): p<.0001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)         :.762 
 
 
 
  
 
Item Name Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Post-office in the 
PSU/EA 
.695     
School in The 
PSU/EA 
  .760   
Police Station in The 
PSU/EA 
.621     
Bus or Taxi service 
in The PSU/EA 
.747     
Electricity Grid in 
The PSU/EA 
  .567   
Railway Station in 
The PSU/EA 
    .395 
Piped Water System 
in The PSU/EA 
    -.413 
Sewage System in 
The PSU/EA 
.716    -.509 
Health Clinic in The 
PSU/EA 
  .485   
Recreational 
facilities in The 
PSU/EA 
   .785  
Community Building  .630    
Petrol Station in The 
PSU/EA 
.745    .371 
Bottle store/bar/beer 
parlour 
 .674 .316 -.345  
Supermarket in The 
PSU/EA 
.682     
Cafes/Eating 
Places/Corner Shops 
in The PSU/EA 
 .736    
Market Stalls in The 
PSU/EA 
 
 .321 .615   
Eigenvalues 5.078 1.811 1.715 1.324 1.233 
Percent of Variance 29.312 8.621 7.985 5.986 4.827 
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Appendix 4: Government Trust Index (GTI) 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS): p<.0001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)         :.899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item Factor 1 
Trust in President .666 
Trust in National assembly .737 
Trust in electoral commission .660 
Trust in state assembly .729 
Trust in state governor .818 
Trust in local government 
council 
.818 
Trust in ruling party .658 
Eigenvalue 4.159 
Percent of Variance 59.412 
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Appendix 5: Government Performance Index (GPI) 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BToS): p<.0001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)         :.881 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
Management 
economic  
.667  
Management job 
creation 
.771  
management price 
stability 
.766  
Management 
narrow wealth gap 
.640  
Management crime  .584  
Management basic 
services 
.460  
Management 
education 
.524  
Management water .558  
Management food .708  
Management 
corruption 
.555  
Management 
conflict resolution 
 -.495 
Management 
malaria 
 -.880 
Management AIDS  .846 
Eigen Value 5.346 1.705 
Percent of 
Variance 
35.632 11.344 
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In Text Tables 
 
 
Table 7: Perceived Government Contact Variables 
V1: Contact local government 
councillor 
V4: Contact National Assembly 
representative 
V2: Contact State Assembly 
representative 
V5: Contact official of a government 
ministry 
V3: Contact official in the state 
governor’s office 
 
V6: Contact political party official 
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Table 8: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Variables 
V1: Country’s present economic conditions 
 
V10: How often gone without medical care 
V2: Your present living conditions 
 
V11: How often gone without cooking fuel 
 
V3: Your living conditions vs. others 
V12: How often gone without electricity 
V13: How often gone without cash income 
V4: Country’s economic conditions 12 
months ago 
 
V14: Difficulty to obtain identity document 
V5: Your living conditions 12 months ago 
 
V15: Difficulty to obtain primary school 
placement 
V6: Country’s economic conditions in 12 
months 
 
V16: Difficulty to obtain voter registration 
card 
 
V7: Your living conditions in 12 months 
 
V17: Difficulty to obtain household services 
 
V8: How often gone without food 
 
V18: Difficulty to obtain government loan or 
payment 
 
V9: How often gone without water 
 
V19: Difficulty to obtain help from the police 
 
 
Table 9: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) Variables 
V1:Post-office in the PSU/EA V9: Health clinic in the PSU/EA 
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V2:School in the PSU/EA V10:Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA 
V3:Police station in the PSU/EA V11:Community buildings in the PSU/EA 
V4:Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA V12:Petrol station in the PSU/EA 
V5:Electricity grid in the PSU/EA V13:Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the 
PSU/EA 
V6:Piped water system in the PSU/EA V14:Supermarket in the PSU/EA 
V7:Sewage system in the PSU/EA V15:Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the 
PSU/EA 
V8:Railway station in the PSU/EA V16:Market Stalls in the PSU/EA 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Univariate Statistics 
Variable 
N Mean Standard 
Error  
Mode Standard 
deviation 
Political 
Violence 
Justification 
617 2.160 .038 2 .950 
Political 
Violence 
Participation 
655 0.305 .018 0.00 (No 
category) 
.461 
Interest in 
Public Affairs 
652 1.18 .027 1 .697 
Perceived 
Ability to Make 
Elected 
Representatives 
Listen 
625 2.62 .044 1 1.112 
Political 
Affiliation: 
595 .432 .020 0 (feel close 
to a party) 
.496 
Perceived 
Government 
Contact 
655 .256 .019 0 .484 
PEMI 666 2.059 .019 2 .493 
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PWI 667 3.635 .063 3.33 1.635 
AEMI 
668 .577 .010 .38 (smallest 
mode) 
.248 
Perceived 
Identity Group 
Treatment 
579 1.860 .041 3 .990 
Perceived 
Group 
Economic 
Marginalisation 
590 1.373 .043 2 1.050 
SFTI 644 2.581 .023 3 .577 
GTI 655 2.617 .018 3 .460 
GPI 663 2.216 .020 3 .512 
Age 667 31.36 .479 20 12.358 
Head of House 
Hold 
668 .645 .019 1 .479 
Gender 668 1.50 .019 2 .500 
Identity 
prioritisation 
600 .375 .020 0 .485 
 
 
Table 11: Political Violence Justification Regression Model 
I.V. Standard 
Error 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Beta  
Coefficient 
t statistic p value 
Constant .538 2.776  5.159 .000 
Interest in Public 
Affairs 
.067 -.202 -.151 -3.032 
.003** 
Perceived Ability to 
Make Elected 
Representatives 
Listen 
.044 -.088 -.098 1.987 .048** 
Perceived 
Government Contact 
.102 .121 .061 1.183 .237 
Political Affiliation:  .096 .047 .025 .493 .622 
PEMI .112 .104 .054 .931 .353 
PWI .032 .007 .013 .235 .814 
AEMI .190 -.067 -.017 -.351 .726 
Perceived Identity 
Group Treatment 
.052 .039 .041 .757 .450 
Perceived Group 
Economic 
Marginalisation 
.051 -.024 -.027 -.477 .634 
SFTI .102 .008 .005 .082 .935 
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GTI .128 -.167 -.083 -1.308 .192 
GPI .104 -.012 -006 -.115 .908 
Age .004 -.001 -.014 -.243 .808 
Head of House Hold .114 -.005 -.002 -.041 .967 
Gender .097 .061 .032 .626 .532 
Identity prioritisation .094 -.102 -.054 -1.084 .279 
Adjusted R2  =.025      P<0.05** 
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Table 6: Political Violence Justification Regression Model 
 
Logistical- Political Violence participation 
479 cases processed in Regression model 
Reference: Not Willing to Use Force or Violence for Political Cause 
 
 
I.V. 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
P value. 
Exp(B)/ 
Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Interest in Public Affairs 1 .121 1.293 .934 1.789 
Perceived Ability to Make Elected 
Representatives Listen 
1 .152 .857 .694 1.059 
Perceived Government Contact 1 p<.001 3.045 1.851 5.009 
Political Affiliation: Not close to party 1 .024 .595 .378 .935 
Reference: Political Affiliation :close to party      
PWI 1 .101 1.132 .976 1.313 
AEMI 1 .806 1.121 .451 2.783 
Perceived Identity Group Treatment 1 .101 1.230 .961 1.576 
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation 1 .433 1.102 0..864 1.405 
SFTI 1 .795 1.067 .654 1.740 
GTI 1 .277 1.410 .759 2.620 
GPI 1 .579 .865 .518 1.445 
Age 1 .010 .971 .949 .993 
Not Head of House Hold 1 .067 1.650 .965 2.822 
Reference: Head of House Hold      
Male  .983 1.005 .635 1.591 
Reference: Female      
Identity Group Prioritisation  .012 1.833 1.144 2.936 
Reference: Nigerian Identity Prioritisation      
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Correlation Matrix: Only significant correlations have been reported (P<0.05*) 
 
Table 1 P.V 
Justification 
P.V. 
Participation 
Interest 
in 
Public 
Affairs 
Ability 
to 
Make 
Elected 
Reps 
Listen 
Perceived 
Gov. 
Contact 
Political 
Affiliation 
PEMI PWI AEMI Identity 
Group 
Treatment 
P.V 
Justification 
1 .122* -.141* -.126* .087*  .    
P.V. 
Participation 
.122* 1 . -.094* .267* .147*   -.083* .103* 
Interest in 
Public Affairs 
-.141*  1 .107*  .165*     
Ability to 
Make Elected 
Reps Listen 
-.126* -.094* .107* 1 -.116*    .108*  
Perceived Gov. 
Contact 
-.087* .267*  -.116*  .090*     
Political 
Affiliation 
 .147* .165*  .090*      
PEMI        .318* -.157* .218* 
PWI       .318*    
AEMI    .108*   -
.157* 
  -.133* 
Identity Group 
Treatment 
 .103*     .218*  -.133* 1 
Identity Group 
Econ. 
Marginalisation 
  .  .137* -.142* -
.293* 
  -.396 
SFTI           
GTI     -.161*  .183*   .273* 
GPI -.087*   .081* -.226*  .303*  -.100* .173* 
Age     .160*     .10* 
Head of 
Household 
 -.124* -.111*  -.151* -.180*     
Gender   -.186*  -.123* -.251*     
Identity Group 
Prioritisation 
-.081 -.161*  .109*     .171* -.154* 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Table 2 P.V 
Justification 
P.V. 
Participation 
Identity Group 
Econ. 
Marginalisatio
n 
SFTI GTI GPI Age Head of 
Househ
old 
Gender Identity Group 
Prioritisation 
P.V 
Justification 
1 .122*         
P.V. 
Participation 
.122* 1    -.087*  -.124*  -.161* 
Interest in 
Public Affairs 
-.141*       -.111* -.186*  
Ability to 
Make Elected 
Reps Listen 
-.126* -.094*    .081*    .109* 
Perceived Gov. 
Contact 
-.087* .267* .137* -.109* -.161* -.226* .160* -.151* -.123*  
Political 
Affiliation 
 .147* -.142*     -.180* -.251*  
PEMI   -.293*  .183* .303*     
PWI   -.279* .123* .163* .133*    -.111* 
AEMI      -.100    .171* 
Identity Group 
Treatment 
 .103* -.396* .130* .273* .173* .101*   -.154* 
Identity Group 
Econ. 
Marginalisation 
   -.259* -.316* -.308*    .116* 
SFTI   -.259* 1 .568* .320*    -.112* 
GTI   -.316* .568* 1 .386*   .083* -.126* 
GPI -.087*  -.308* .323* .386* 1  -.004*  -.086* 
Age       1 -.482* -.082*  
Head of 
Household 
 -.124*     -.482* 1 .323*  
Gender     .083*  -.082* .323* 1  
Identity Group 
Prioritisation 
-.081 -.161* .116* -.112* -.126* -.086*    1 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Afrobarometer Questionnaire  
 
 
Political Marginalisation Questions 
 
Interest in Public Affairs 
 
Question Number: Q27 
Question Number: How interested are you in public affairs? 
Variable label: Interest in public affairs 
Values: 0-2, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not interested, 1=Somewhat interested, 2=Very interested, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Perceived Ability to Make Elected officials listen 
 
Question Number: Q28C 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If you had to, you would be 
able to get together with others to make elected representatives listen to your concerns. 
Variable label: Can make elected representatives listen 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 
5=Strongly Disagree, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: The interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Perceived Government Contact 
 
Question Number: Q29A1-NIG 
Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A State Assembly representative? 
Variable label: Contact State Assembly representative 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Question Number: Q29A2-NIG 
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Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a 
problem or to give them your views: An official in the state governor’s office? 
Variable label: Contact official in the state governor’s office 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Question Number: Q29B 
Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a 
problem or to give them your views: A National Assembly Representative? 
Variable label: Contact National Assembly representative 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Question Number: Q29C 
Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a 
problem or to give them your views: An official of a government ministry? 
Variable label: Contact official of a government ministry 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
 
Question Number: Q29D 
Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a 
problem or to give them your views: A political party official? 
Variable label: Contact political party official 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Question Number: Q29E 
Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a 
problem or to give them your views: A religious leader? 
Variable label: Contact religious leader 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
Data 
Question Number: Q43A 
98 
 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The President? 
Variable label: Trust the President 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data  
 
Question Number: Q43B 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The National Assembly? 
Variable label: Trust National Assembly 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43C 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Independent National Electoral Commission? 
Variable label: Trust the Independent National Electoral Commission 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43D 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your State Assembly? 
Variable label: Trust your state assembly 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43D1-NIG 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your State Governor? 
Variable label: Trust your state governor 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q43E 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your Local Government Council? 
Variable label: Trust your local government council 
99 
 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43F 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Ruling Party? 
Variable label: Trust the ruling party 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q87A 
Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, 
which party or organization is that? 
Variable label: Close to political party 
Values: 0, 260-268, 995, 998-999, -1 
Value Labels: 0=No, not close to any party, 260=Yes, People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 
261=Yes, All Nigeria People’s Party (APP), 262=Yes, Alliance for Democracy (AD), 263=Yes, 
People’s Redemption Party (PRP), 264=Yes, All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), 
265=Yes, NCP, 266=Yes, UNPP, 267=Yes, UNDP, 268=Yes, 
NDP, 995=Other, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don’t Know, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q41D 
Question: In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law? 
Variable label: People are treated unequally 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, 
-1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q50A 
Question: How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like National Assembly members, 
State Governors or Local Government Councilors, try their best: To look after the interests of 
people like you? 
Variable label: Leaders look after people’s interests 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Some of the time, 2=Most of the time, 3=Always, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 
 
Question Number: Q50B 
Question: How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like National Assembly members, 
State Governors or Local Government Councilors, try their best: To listen to what people like 
you have to say? 
Variable label: Leaders listen to people 
100 
 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Some of the time, 2=Most of the time, 3=Always, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q58C 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? A voter registration card for yourself. 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Questions 
 
Question Number: Q1A 
Question: Let’s begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you 
describe: The present 
economic conditions of this country? 
Variable label: Country’s present economic condition 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q1B 
Question: In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? 
Variable label: Your present living conditions 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q2B 
Question: In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other 
Nigerians? 
Variable label: Your living conditions vs. others 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q3A 
Question: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Economic conditions in this country? 
Variable label: Country’s economic conditions 12 months ago 
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Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q3B 
Question: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Your 
living conditions? 
Variable label: Your living conditions 12 months ago 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q4A 
Question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic 
conditions in this country in twelve months time? 
Variable label: Country’s economic conditions in 12 months 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q4B 
Question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living 
conditions in twelve months time? 
Variable label: Your living conditions in 12 months 
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q9A 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough 
food to eat? 
Variable label: How often gone without food 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question Number: Q9B 
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Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough 
clean water for home use? 
Variable label: How often gone without water 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q9C 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: 
Medicines or medical treatment? 
Variable label: How often gone without medical care 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q9D 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: 
Electricity in your home? 
Variable label: How often gone without electricity 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q9E 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough 
fuel to cook your food? 
Variable label: How often gone without cooking fuel 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q9F 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: A cash 
income? 
Variable label: How often gone without cash income 
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
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Question Number: Q58A 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? An identity document (such as a birth 
certificate, driver’s license, orpassport). 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain identity document 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q58B 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? A place in primary school for a child. 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain primary school placement 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q58C 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? A voter registration card for yourself. 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q58D 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try 
and get these services from government? Household services (like piped water, electricity or 
telephone). 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain household services 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q58E 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? A loan or payment from government 
(such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant). 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain government loan or payment 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
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Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
 
Question Number: Q58F 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or 
do you never try and get these services from government? Help from the police when you need 
it. 
Variable label: Difficulty to obtain help from the police 
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don’t 
Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Personal Wealth Index (PWI) Questions 
 
Question Number: Q6A 
Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which 
number would you give yourself today? 
Variable label: Score self poor/rich today 
Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not 
Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don’t Know, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q6B 
Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which 
number would you give your parents ten years ago? 
Variable label: Score parent rich/poor 10 years ago 
Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not 
Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don’t Know, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q6C 
Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which 
number do you expect your children to attain in the future? 
Variable label: Score children rich/poor in future 
Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not 
Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don’t Know, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Area Economic Marginalisation (AEMI) Questions 
 
 
 
Question Number: Q112A 
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Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Post-office? 
Variable label: Post-office in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine  
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112B 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
School? 
Variable label: School in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112C 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Police station? 
Variable label: Police station in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112D 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Regular bus or taxi service? 
Variable label: Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112E 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Electricity grid that most houses could access? 
Variable label: Electricity grid in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112F 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Piped water system that most houses could access? 
Variable label: Piped water system in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
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Question Number: Q112G 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Sewage system that most houses could access? 
Variable label: Sewage system in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112H 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Railway station? 
Variable label: Railway station in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112I 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Health clinic? 
Variable label: Health clinic in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112J 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Recreational facilities for e.g. a sports field? 
Variable label: Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112K 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Any churches, mosques, temples or other places of worship? 
Variable label: Places of worship in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112L 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Any town halls or community buildings that can be used for meetings? 
Variable label: Community buildings in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
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Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112M 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Petrol station? 
Variable label: Petrol station in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112N 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Bottle store/bar/beer parlour? 
Variable label: Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112O 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Supermarket (food and/or clothing)? 
Variable label: Supermarket in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Source: SAB 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112P 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Cafes/eating places/corner shops? 
Variable label: Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Question Number: Q112Q 
Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: 
Market stalls (selling groceries and/or clothing)? 
Variable label: Market stalls in the PSU/EA 
Values: 0, 1, 9 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can’t determine 
Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor 
 
Identity Group Marginalisation Questions 
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Question Number: Q55 
Question: Are ____________s’ [respondent’s identity group] economic conditions worse, the 
same as, or better than other groups in this country? 
Variable label: Identity group’s economic conditions 
Values: 1-5, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much Better, 2=Better, 3=About the Same, 4=Worse, 5=Much Worse, 7=Not 
Applicable, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on 
question 54, this question was marked as “Not Applicable.” 
 
Question Number: Q56 
Question: How often are ___________s [respondent’s identity group] treated unfairly by the 
government? 
Variable label: Identity group treated unfairly 
Values: 0-3, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on 
question 54, this question was marked as “Not Applicable.” 
 
Control Variables 
 
Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) Questions 
 
Question Number: Q43H 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Army? 
Variable label: Trust the army 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q43I 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Police? 
Variable label: Trust the police 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Havent’ 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
 
Government Trust Index (GTI) Questions 
 
Question Number: Q43A 
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Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The President? 
Variable label: Trust the President 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data  
 
Question Number: Q43B 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The National Assembly? 
Variable label: Trust National Assembly 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43C 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Independent National Electoral Commission? 
Variable label: Trust the Independent National Electoral Commission 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43D 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your State Assembly? 
Variable label: Trust your state assembly 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43D1-NIG 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your State Governor? 
Variable label: Trust your state governor 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Question Number: Q43E 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Your Local Government Council? 
Variable label: Trust your local government council 
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Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Question Number: Q43F 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: The Ruling Party? 
Variable label: Trust the ruling party 
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
Government Performance Index (GPI) 
 
Question Number: Q45A 
Question: Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly 
would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say: Managing the economy? 
Variable label: Handling managing the economy 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45B 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Creating jobs? 
Variable label: Handling creating jobs 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45C 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Keeping prices stable? 
Variable label: Handling keeping prices stable 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45D 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor? 
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Variable label: Handling narrowing gaps between rich and poor 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45E 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Reducing crime? 
Variable label: Handling reducing crime 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45F 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Improving basic health services? 
Variable label: Handling improving basic health services 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45G 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Addressing educational needs? 
Variable label: Handling addressing educational needs 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45H 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Delivering household water? 
Variable label: Handling delivering household water 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
Question Number: Q45I 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat? 
Variable label: Handling ensuring everyone has enough to eat 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
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Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45J 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Fighting corruption in government? 
Variable label: Handling fighting corruption in government 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45K 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Resolving conflicts between 
communities? 
Variable label: Handling resolving conflicts between communities 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45K1 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Combating malaria? 
Variable label: Handling combating malaria 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q45L 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Combating HIV/AIDS? 
Variable label: Handling combating HIV/AIDS 
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don’t 
Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
 
 
 
Age 
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Question Number: Q80 
Question: Finally, let us record a few facts about yourself. How old were you at your last 
birthday? 
Variable label: Age 
Values: 18+, 998-999, -1 
Value Labels: 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don’t Know, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Head of Household 
 
Question Number: Q81 
Question: Are you the head of the household? 
Variable label: Head of household 
Values: 0, 1, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
 
Gender 
 
Question Number: Q96 
Question: Respondent’s gender 
Variable label: Gender of respondent 
Values: 1, 2 
Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female 
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
 
Identity Group Prioritisation Questions  
 
Question Number: Q57 
Question: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Nigerian and being a ________ 
[respondent’s 
identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? 
Variable label: Group or national identity 
Values: 0-1, 7, 9, 98, -1 
Value Labels: 0=National identity, 1=Group identity, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on 
question 54, this question was marked as “Not Applicable.” 
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